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1.1 Two-Way Interconnection 
This work is concerned with the economics of networks characterized by 
two-way interconnection. The term interconnection is widely used in the 
literature on network industries to describe the linking of different networks. 
Specifically, for telecommunications networks, the European Community's 
interconnection directive 97 /33/EC defines interconnection in the following 
way: 
'Interconnection' means the physical and logical linking of telecommunications 
networks used by the same or a different organization in order to allow the 
users of one organization to communicate with users of the same or another 
organization, or to access services provided by another organization. 
The problem with this formulation is that it subsumes two quite different 
meanings in one word. The usual understanding of interconnection is the one 
given in the first part of the definition, i.e. the physical and logical linking 
of telecommunications networks used by the same or a different organization 
in order to allow the users of one organization to communicate with users 
of the same or another organization. The second part of the definition also 
allows the term interconnection to refer to the linking of telecommunications 
networks in order to allow the users of one organization to access services 
provided by another organization. This, however, is something rather dif-
ferent. In order to avoid confusion, the type of interconnection addressed 
in the second part of the definition is usually called access to a network, 
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or, alternatively, one-way interconnection. The first part of the definition is 
then what is often referred to as two-way interconnection, and this is also the 
interpretation of the term interconnection we use in this work. 
We do not intend to study the technical problems of interconnection, nor do 
we address the legal obligations which are partly responsible for the existence 
of interconnection of networks. We start with the observation that networks, 
especially telecommunications networks are interconnected, and then we ask 
what are the economic implications of this for the network industry, the single 
networks, and the end users of the networks. This is the meaning of the title 
of this book, 'The economics of two-way interconnection'. 
1.2 Telecommunications 
Why is the market for telecommunications an interesting object of study? 
What makes it so different from the market for, say, apples? A short answer 
would be that telecommunications involves all the characteristics which are 
typical for so-called network producf,S, This is not the whole truth, how-
ever, and the question deserves a more detailed answer. In the following 
paragraphs, we provide some keywords which serve to make clear some of 
the important special features of the market for telecommunications. We 
start with a simple situation: Imagine Anna wants to talk to Bob, who lives 
in another town. The simplest way to do this is to make a phone call to 
Bob. What are the characteristics of the telecommunications market Anna 
encounters by doing so? 
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• Complementarities: Anna could go and search for a public phone booth, 
but if she wants to call Bob regularly, she might find it useful to buy 
a telephone of her own. However, owning a telephone is not enough. 
Additionally, Anna's telephone must be connected to an active tele-
phone line which makes access to the public telephone network possible. 
Anna's telephone is only useful in connection with the telecommunica-
tions services provided by the operator of the public network. Without 
a telephone, on the other hand, these services are themselves useless. 
The telephone and the services provided are complements. 
• Network externalities: Even if Anna owns a telephone and is connected 
to a network, this will only enable her to talk to Bob, if Bob is also 
connected and has a telephone. This is true for any person Anna might 
want to call. Hence the value of the phone and the service to Anna 
depends strongly on the number of other users which are connected. If 
Bob buys a phone and subscribes to the network, this increases Anna's 
willingness to pay for her own services, a positive externality which is 
called network externality. 
• Call externalities: Anna calls Bob because she likes to talk to him. 
When Bob's telephone rings, he will most probably answer it, even if 
he does not know who the caller is. The reason he answers the phone 
is that his expected utility of doing so is positive. Bob might receive 
nuisance calls now and then, but usually, and on average, he benefits 
from being called. The utility he receives from Anna's call is a positive 
externality known as the call externality. 
• Economies of scale: If Bob lives in the same country as Anna, and if 
both use a fixed-line telephone for their call, it is most likely that they 
are connected to the same network. The reason for this is that fixed-line 
network operators within a country are usually monopolists. Establish-
ing a fixed-line network involves huge sunk costs, basically because it 
requires wiring the whole country with copper lines and physically con-
necting each household to the nearest switch of the network via the 'last 
mile'. Once the network is set up, however, delivering calls through it 
generates only marginal costs which are quite small. These significant 
economies of scale have led to the view that the telecommunications in-
dustry is a 'natural monopoly', and governments have usually licensed 
only a single company to provide telecommunications services. 
• Interconnection: If Anna and Bob live in different countries, or if they 
use a mobile phone for their call, it is quite possible that they will be 
connected to different networks. The natural monopoly argument does 
not apply for mobile telecommunications, since it is much easier and 
less costly to establish a mobile network, where the 'last mile' is bridged 
via electromagnetic waves rather than via copper cables. However, if 
Anna and Bob are subscribed to different mobile telecommunications 
networks, they can only conduct a phone call if these networks are inter-
connected (in the sense of two-way interconnection as explained above). 
Since different networks, even if they are interconnected, usually com-
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pete with each other for customers, this raises additional problems on 
the supply side. 
• CPP vs. RPP: A part of the costs of Anna's call to Bob is borne by the 
network Bob is connected to. These are particularly the costs of trans-
mitting the call from the point of interconnection to the base station 
next to Bob's position, and the costs of terminating the call at Bob's 
mobile phone. There are basically two possibilities for Bob's network to 
be compensated for these costs. It could either charge Bob for receiving 
a call on his mobile phone, or it could charge Anna's network, which 
will then collect (part of) this charge from Anna via increased retail 
prices. 1 The first payment system is called the 'Receiving Party Pays' 
(RPP) system, and the second one the 'Calling Party Pays' (CPP) sys-
tem. CPP is the de facto standard in Europe, while RPP is used in the 
USA, Canada, and Hong Kong. In this work we concentrate exclusively 
on the CPP system. 
• Termination-based price discrimination: If Anna calls Bob on her mo-
bile phone, the price she pays for a call-minute will most likely depend 
on whether Bob is connected to the same or a different network. In the 
former case, the call does not leave their network, it is called an on-net 
call. In the latter case, the call is transfered from Anna's to Bob's net-
work at the point of interconnection, a switch where calls are routed 
into the network where they terminate. In this case we speak of an 
off-net call. If a network's price for on-net calls differs from the price 
for off-net calls, the network engages in termination-based price dis-
crimination. Interestingly, this type of price discrimination introduces 
another kind of externalities: 
• Tariff-mediated network externalities: Assume for the moment, that the 
price of on-net calls is lower than the price of off-net calls. Assume also, 
that the market is covered, i.e. each consumer is subscribed to some 
network. Under these circumstances the standard network externalities 
discussed above are exhausted, the sum of the networks' customers 
cannot grow any more. Nevertheless, Anna benefits if the market share 
of her network increases. The reason is that she can reach more of her 
1 In principle Bob's network could also charge Anna directly, but this possibility is 
usually ruled out for technical and/or legal reasons, because it would require Bob's network 
to be able to bill virtually any person who might want to call one of its customers. 
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calling partners on-net, where it is cheaper to call. Hence Anna benefits 
(in expectation) whenever some customer of another network switches 
to her network. This constitutes a positive externality. However, since 
it does not work directly, but is mediated through the discriminating 
tariffs, it is called a tariff-mediated network externality. It should be 
mentioned that some economists refuse to call this effect an externality 
at all, since it relies on the price system to work. However, this is 
mainly a matter of how strict one defines the term 'externality'. 
• Balanced calling patterns: Note that the presence of tariff-mediated 
network externalities as explained above relies on the implicit assump-
tion that there is a positive probability for Anna to call any other 
customer. To see this, imagine that Anna exclusively calls Bob, and 
nobody else. Then, as long as Bob is subscribed to the same network 
as Anna, she does not care at all about her network's market share. 
The tariff-mediated network externalities exist only between Anna and 
her calling partners. If one assumes, as is regularly done in the lit-
erature, that Anna is equally likely to call any other customer, then 
we speak of balanced calling patterns. If calling patterns are balanced, 
the percentage of all calls terminating on some network is equal to the 
percentage of all calls originating on this network, and both are equal 
to this network's market share. This makes calculations much easier 
in our models, but the question remains if the assumption of balanced 
calling patterns is really well-founded. 
• Nonlinear pricing: Anna and Bob do not only pay for their phone calls, 
they are also likely to pay a fixed monthly fee for being connected. 
This means that the pricing scheme is nonlinear. 2 If a fixed fee is 
combined with a per-minute price for calls, we speak of a two-part 
tariff A network using a two-part tariff has two distinct instruments 
to compete for market share and generate profit. Note that the fixed fee 
and the price for a call affect demand rather differently. While demand 
for subscription in general depends on both the fixed fee and the per-
minute charge, a subscribed customer's call volume is independent of 
the fixed fee, at least in the absence of wealth effects. 
2Total payment as a function of minutes called is still an affine linear function, but the 
term linear pricing solely denotes the case where this function is strictly linear, i.e. where 
there is no fixed fee. 
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• Access charges: If Anna and Bob are subscribed to different networks, 
then, as mentioned above, the call originating from Anna's mobile 
phone is switched to Bob's network at some point of interconnection. 
From there it is transmitted to the base station next to Bob, and the 
'last mile' to Bob's mobile phone, where the call terminates, is bridged 
via electromagnetic waves. This means that parts of the total marginal 
costs of the phone call are borne by Bob's network. Under CPP, Bob's 
network will charge Anna's network a per-minute price for terminat-
ing Anna's call. This price is sometimes called termination charge or 
interconnection fee. Unfortunately, in the academic literature the some-
what misleading term access charge is the most commonly used one. 
While access is something different from interconnection, as discussed 
in Section 1.1, we will nevertheless, for the sake of continuity, also use 
the term 'access charge' for what should really be called 'termination 
charge'. 
1.3 The Role of the Access Charge 
Even if there is a large number of network operators in a telecommunications 
market, a single network is not subjected to any competition in one particular 
part of its services, namely in terminating calls to its customers. It is obvious, 
and seems technically unavoidable, that networks retain a monopoly position 
with respect to termination of such calls, and since networks can generate 
profits on incoming calls by raising their access charge above marginal cost, 
all the regulatory concerns usually associated with monopoly power also arise 
in these markets. 
Should access charges be regulated, and if so, how? Before we address this 
question within a formal model, we will try to provide some intuition about 
the role these access charges play for prices, profits, and welfare. 
The first thing to notice is that access charges are part of the perceived 
marginal costs of an off-net call. As mentioned earlier, an off-net call gen-
erates 'true', technical marginal costs for the originating network up to the 
point where the call is handled over to the rival network. The remaining 
part of the marginal costs as perceived by the network originating the call 
are the access charges payed to the network terminating the call. Since these 
access charges need not be equal to true marginal costs of termination, the 
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perceived total marginal costs of an off-net call will in general be different 
from the true total marginal costs. 
When setting its prices, a profit maximizing network will equalize marginal 
revenue and marginal costs. However, it is the perceived, not the true 
marginal costs, it will take into account in this optimization procedure. Hence 
end-user prices of a network are (partly} determined by perceived marginal 
costs, and hence by its rivals' access charges. Particularly, a network will 
raise its price (for off-net calls, in the case of termination-based price dis-
crimination}, if one of the rivals increases its access charge. 
Now let us consider what happens if two competing networks are allowed to 
set their access charges independently, i.e. noncooperatively. 
Consider two symmetric networks competing in a covered market. By 'sym-
metric' we mean that the networks are basically identical, they have the same 
cost structure, pricing method, quality delivered, and so on. Under some 
additional assumptions, outlined in the following chapters, there will be a 
symmetric equilibrium, where these networks set the same access charges, 
offer the same prices, and share the market equally. With balanced calling 
patterns, the total number of calls originating from a network and terminat-
ing on the other network, i.e. the number of off-net calls, will be the same for 
both networks. Hence the total access charge payments a network makes to 
its rival is exactly equal to the total access charge payments it receives. These 
payments cancelling out, it seems as if profits are completely unaffected by 
the access charge. 
This is not the case, however. Indeed, the belief that access charges play no 
role is widespread, 3 and has been termed the bill-and-keep fallacy by Laffont 
and Tirole (2000}. As we have explained above, access charges have no direct, 
but an indirect effect on profits through their influence on end-user prices. 
If a network, let us call it network A, unilaterally increases its access charge, 
its rivals' average end-user price will go up, and as a consequence, indirect 
utility of the customers of A's rivals goes down. Since customers compare 
the net utilities they receive from the available networks in their subscription 
decision, they will tend to switch to network A, increasing A's market share 
and profit. 
3 Armstrong (1998) mentions a paper by the New Zealand Ministry of Commerce sup-
porting this wrong intuition. 
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The same is true, however, for the rival network. In the end, both networks 
will increase their access charges, and this may well raise call prices above the 
monopoly level. This is detrimental to both consumer and producer surplus, 
and hence calls for regulatory intervention. Note that this effect, which 
has been called the raise-each-other's-cost effect, is similar to the double 
marginalization problem arising in vertically structured industries and well 
known in the theory of industrial organization. 
For these reasons, it is commonly agreed that networks should not be allowed 
to set their access charges noncooperatively. One way of alleviating the 
double marginalization problem is to impose reciprocity of access charges, 
i.e. to demand that both networks charge the same unit access fee. This can 
be achieved by a regulator setting an appropriate reciprocal access charge, 
or by letting the networks freely negotiate over the access charge, subject 
only to reciprocity. In many OECD countries, interconnection arrangements 
are indeed handled in the latter way, with regulatory intervention only if 
negotiations fail. Now, while collusion over retail prices is illegal in general, 
cooperative agreement on a reciprocal access charge is not only allowed, but 
often encouraged. This makes sense only if firms are not able to indirectly 
collude over retail prices by colluding over the access charge. Unfortunately 
this is by no means obvious. 
1.4 Literature Overview 
1.4.1 Linear Pricing Models 
In the second half of the 1990s, serious concerns have been raised in the liter-
ature about firms' ability to use a cooperatively determined access charge as 
a collusion device (see e.g. Brennan (1997)). As noted already by Katz et al. 
(1995), networks have an incentive to agree on a high (above marginal cost) 
reciprocal access charge in order to achieve high end user prices. Together 
with the confirming results from the first explicit models (see below for de-
tails on this literature), this has led many researchers to adopt the view that 
collusion in the retail market is associated with high access charges. This 
view was only slightly clouded by subsequent opposite results arising from 
refinements of the basic models, which tried to eliminate some of the less 
realistic assumptions of these models. 
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The first to show the negative welfare effects of cooperatively determined 
access charges within an explicit model were Armstrong (1998), Laffont et al. 
(1998a) - henceforth LRTa - and Carter and Wright (1999). They employ 
models where two networks are horizontally differentiated in the Hotelling 
style and compete for customers in linear, nondiscriminating prices. The 
model of LRTa is by now widely accepted as the "standard model" of two-
way interconnection, and most of the subsequent literature uses this model as 
a starting point. Basic assumptions of LRTa's model include that consumers 
do not benefit from receiving calls and that calling patterns are balanced. 
All these authors conclude that the negotiated access charge may be used as 
a collusive device and will definitely exceed the marginal cost of access. 
1.4.2 Nonlinear Pricing Models 
If networks may compete in nonlinear prices, e.g. two-part tariffs, this result 
does no longer hold. As LRTa show, equilibrium profits are independent of 
the access charge, leaving networks indifferent about the price of interconnec-
tion. The intuition is that although usage fees still increase with the access 
charge, networks can counterbalance the negative impact on market share 
by lowering the fixed fee. Thus competition remains strong, and the access 
charge looses its collusive function. 
Dessein (2003) studies a model where consumers differ in volume demand 
or subscription demand. He shows that introducing heterogeneity in volume 
demand leaves the neutrality of the access charge unaffected. This result 
is also supported by Hahn (2004). If demand for subscription is elastic, 
however, some consumers may choose not to subscribe in equilibrium. As 
Dessein (2003) and Schiff (2002) show, this leads networks to prefer an access 
charge below marginal cost. The reason for this is the emergence of positive 
network externalities in the absence of full participation. 
1.4.3 Termination-Based Price Discrimination 
The mentioned models do best describe local fixed-line telecommunications 
networks. With the rise of mobile telecommunications, however, the prac-
tice of termination-based price discrimination became apparent. In mobile 
networks it is commonly observed that different prices are charged for calls 
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terminating in different networks. Termination-based price discrimination 
was already studied by Economides et al. (1996). However, their results dif-
fer substantially from the results discussed below, since they assume that 
subscription decisions are made before prices are set, which renders market 
shares effectively exogenous. 
A seminal paper introducing price discrimination into the models mentioned 
above is Laffont et al. (1998b), henceforth referred to as LRTb4 • Among 
other results they show that with linear pricing, the collusive role of the 
access charge is reduced by the possibility of price discrimination. The reason 
is that similar to the case of two-part tariffs above, a higher access charge 
is reflected in a higher off-net price, but the building of market share is 
not necessarily linked to an increase in the access deficit, since customers 
can be attracted by lowering the on-net price. However, as opposed to the 
nondiscriminatory, nonlinear pricing case, the collusive role of a high access 
charge is not completely removed. Proposition 2 of LRTb states that the 
access charge still locally acts as a collusion device, which means that profits 
increase locally, if the access charge is increased above marginal cost. 
As in the nondiscriminatory case, the corresponding result for nonlinear 
prices is quite different. Gans and King (2001) demonstrate that networks 
competing in two-part tariffs with discriminating call prices will negotiate a 
very low (below marginal cost) access charge in order to soften competition. 
They also conclude that the widespread bill-and-keep arrangements, corre-
sponding to a zero access charge, may be undesirable from the consumers' 
perspective. As Cherdron (2001) notes, however, their result, predicting 
off-net prices below on-net prices, is somewhat at odds with what can be 
observed in existing mobile networks. 
Also other authors have asked if bill-and-keep arrangements, which are usu-
ally argued to save transaction costs, are actually anticompetitive. A nat-
ural benchmark against which the welfare effects of such an agreement can 
be evaluated is cost-based access pricing, which sets access charges equal to 
marginal cost, corresponding to conventional regulatory wisdom. As men-
tioned above, Gans and King (2001) favor cost-based access charges, arguing 
that bill-and-keep arrangements may be used to soften competition. An op-
posing position is taken by Cambini and Valletti (2003), who demonstrate 
4 A summary of the results of LRTa and LRTb is given in Laffont et al. (1997). 
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that bill-and-keep arrangements may be beneficial due to a positive impact 
on investments in quality prior to the competition stage. 
Given the important characteristics of mobile telecommunications markets 
outlined above, it is surprising that the literature completely lacks a model of 
a caller-pays system incorporating nonlinear pricing and termination-based 
price discrimination as well as call externalities. Laffont et al. (1998b), Gans 
and King (2001), and Cambini and Valletti (2003) study the case of nonlinear 
discriminatory pricing, but without call externalities. Kim and Lim (2001), 
DeGraba (2003), and Jeon et al. (2004) take into account the call externality, 
but they concentrate on receiver-pays systems (where the importance of call 
externalities is more obvious). Hahn's (2003) model has nonlinear pricing and 
call externalities but studies a monopolistic network. Finally, Armstrong's 
(2002) extensive survey includes a small study of nonlinear pricing in the 
presence of call externalities, but without price discrimination. 
1.5 Introducing Call Externalities 
Summarizing the above, while under nonlinear pricing networks are either 
indifferent about the access charge or prefer an access charge below marginal 
cost, the work concerned with the linear pricing case unanimously suggests 
that networks will negotiate a high access charge to maximize joint profits. 
Subsequently, we will show that actually the opposite might be the outcome 
of network competition in linear prices, and networks might well make use of 
a reciprocal access charge below marginal cost. This result may look similar 
to the one of Gans and King (2001), but there is an important difference. 
While their result has been criticized for being out of line with observed 
price structures, this does not apply to our findings, at least in the linear 
pricing case. Access might be sold at a discount, but off-net prices still 
exceed on-net prices in equilibrium. Moreover, there turns out to be little 
scope for regulatory intervention against bill-and-keep arrangements. These 
arrangements might result from collusion, but then they are also welfare 
improving compared with cost-based access pricing. 
However, for competition in two-part tariffs, the Gans and King (2001) result 
is confirmed if receivers' utility is taken into account. The negotiated access 
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charge is always below marginal cost, and off-net calls are cheaper than on-
net calls. 
All of the papers discussed in the introduction share the basic assumption 
that a call generates utility only for the caller and not for the receiver. In 
this work we divert from this assumption by introducing call externalities. 
The obvious point that a call generates utility also for the receiver has been 
recognized5 , but nonetheless widely neglected in the literature. Only recently, 
Kim and Lim (2001), and Jeon et al. (2004) have come up with similar 
models incorporating a call externality. However, they study a RPP system, 
where both the caller and the receiver of a call are charged. Note that the 
receiver of a phone call incurs the opportunity costs of the time the call 
takes. Hence he must get some strictly positive utility from a call, otherwise 
he would not answer the call. On the other hand it might be argued that 
at least on average the utility of the receiver will be smaller than the utility 
of the caller. Whatever the "real" average magnitude of receivers' utility, 
neglecting it is likely to introduce a relevant distortion in the analysis of 
network competition. 
First, however, it can be seen that under nondiscriminatory pricing the anal-
ysis of competition remains unchanged6 • It is clear that volume demand is 
independent of any call externality. Obviously, nondiscriminating prices also 
make the subscription decision independent of receivers' utility. Hence nei-
ther subscription nor volume demand or profits are influenced by the level of 
passive utility. This means that the results derived from the standard model 
of nondiscriminatory pricing discussed above carry over to the extension we 
study here. The only deviation from LRTa's model arises in the judgement of 
welfare implications. Indeed, neglecting the call externality underestimates 
social welfare. To implement the social optimum, the price of a call would 
have to be below marginal cost. 
Volume demand stays of course independent of the call externality also with 
termination-based price discrimination, but the subscription decision is in-
fluenced if on-net prices differ from off-net prices. This is because the utility 
from receiving calls contributes to the positive network externality under on-
net prices (say) below off-net prices. An increase in a network's market share 
5DeGraba (2003) suggests that the total utility generated by a call is shared equally 
between the calling parties. See also the discussion in Hahn (2003). 
6See also the discussion in Schiff (2001). 
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raises the number of calls received by (and hence benefits the) subscribers of 
this network. In their subscription decision, consumers compare the net util-
ities they receive from joining either network. If a network raises its off-net 
price, this has two effects. First, the net utility of this network's customers 
decreases, and second, since these customers' demand for off-net calls falls, 
also the rival network's customers suffer, because they less frequently enjoy 
the benefit of being called. This second effect lowers customers' incentives 
to switch to the rival network. As the access charge, the call externality is 
reflected in equilibrium prices, which determine profits. Indeed, if the utility 
of receiving calls is sufficiently high, the second effect explained above be-
comes so strong that networks will prefer an access discount in order to keep 
the resulting off-net prices below the monopoly price. 
This analysis rests on the assumption that profits are directly determined 
only by prices. Note, however, that in the case of two-part tariffs profits also 
depend on the fixed fee. As mentioned above, this has a deep impact on the 
nature of competition. The case of termination-based price discrimination 
with two-part tariffs is analyzed in chapter 5.2 of Jeon et al. (2004). Although 
their work is devoted to the RPP system, they include a short study of 
their model in the absence of reception charge, which of course coincides 
with a caller pays system. Interestingly, they show that if receivers' utility 
is high enough (equal to callers' utility), then for any given level of the 
access charge, the price for off-net calls in a symmetric equilibrium becomes 
infinite, resulting in connectivity breakdown. The intuition for this is the 
following. Any off-net call made generates utility for the caller and the 
receiver. However, since only the caller pays for the call, if receivers' utility 
is high, net surplus is higher for the receiver than for the caller. This means 
that while raising the off-net price may decrease the direct profit from off-net 
calls, at the same time it makes the own network more attractive, resulting 
in an increase in market share. The total effect on profit becomes positive, 
if receivers' utility is high. Furthermore, if receivers' utility is high enough, 
the total effect on profit is positive regardless of the level of the off-net price. 
This, of course, means that the only equilibrium has an infinite off-net price. 
We conclude that the introduction of call externalities has a strong impact 
on the outcome of competition in the case of termination-based price dis-
crimination. This is the case we study in Chapters 3 and 4 of this work. 
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1.6 Outline 
In Chapter 2, as a starting point, we describe the standard model of LRTb 
used in the majority of the literature on network competition. In Chapter 3 
we extend the standard model with linear pricing by call externalities. We 
show that some of the conventional wisdom on the collusive role of the access 
charge is overturned under this extension. The impact of call externalities on 
competition in the standard model with two-part tariffs is studied in Chapter 
4. Here we argue that the traditional reasons put forward against the access 
pricing practice known as bill-and-keep turn out to be ill-founded once call 
externalities are taken into account. Chapter 5 departs from the duopoly 
assumption and studies the case of three or more competing networks. We 
show that the determination of market shares calls for a dynamic setting, and 
that this raises several serious problems like nonexistence or multiplicity of 
stable equilibria, or nonconvergence of market shares even for fixed prices. In 
Chapter 6 we introduce a local interaction structure between agents, thereby 
giving up the standard but unrealistic assumption of balanced calling pat-
terns. For the usually observed case of on-net prices below off-net prices we 
show that this typically generates a multitude of consumer equilibria, which 
creates severe problems for the prediction of market shares. 
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Chapter 2 
The Basic Model 
In this section we introduce the model. It is based on the model of LRTb, 
but for simplicity we will neglect the fixed costs (which does not change the 
results qualitatively). On the other hand, we extend the model by adding 
the call externality. 
2.1 Cost and Price Structure 
Imagine a telecommunications market which is served by two interconnected 
networks labeled 1 and 2. Both networks have full coverage, i.e. every con-
sumer can be reached by all other consumers, no matter which network they 
are subscribed to. The marginal cost of originating or terminating a call is 
Co > 0, and the total marginal cost of a call is 
where c1 ~ 0 is the marginal cost of transmitting a call from the originating 
to the terminating end. The reciprocal unit access charge is a~ -(eo + c1). 
Note that access charges may be negative. Setting a negative access charge 
corresponds to subsidising termination. The subsidy cannot be larger than 
the costs of originating and transmitting a call, however, since otherwise a 
network could make unlimited profits by installing a computer which perma-
nently calls into the rival network. 
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Networks either compete in linear prices Pii (for on-net calls within network i) 
and Pii (for off-net calls originating in network i and terminating in network 
j), or, in the case of two-part tariffs, also in the fixed fee ~-
2.2 Subscription Decision and Demand 
On the demand side there is a large number of consumers, formally a con-
tinuum. A consumer can be member of at most one network. From the 
consumers' point of view the networks are horizontally differentiated, and 
this differentiation is of the Hotelling type. The networks are located at the 
extreme points of the unit interval (0, 1], and each consumer is located at 
some address x E [O, l]. The total mass of consumers, normalized to 1, is dis-
tributed uniformly on this interval. The degree of horizontal differentiation 
is measured by a parameter t corresponding to the "transport costs" . This 
means that a consumer located at address x faces a disutility of tix - xii if 
he subscribes to network i, where x1 = 0 and x2 = 1 are the locations of the 
two networks.1 
Consumers have homogeneous preferences for calls to other consumers. Calls 
to distinct other consumers constitute independent goods and total utility 
is assumed to be additively separable. The utility from an active call of 
length q is given by u(q), where u' > 0 and u" < 0. For technical reasons we 
also assume that the Inada conditions limq-+O u1(q) = oo, limq-+oo u'(q) = 0 
are fulfilled, guaranteeing strictly positive and finite demand for all positive 
prices. It is helpful here to imagine that each consumer makes exactly one 
call to each other consumer, and only the length of a call is variable. 
Consumers also derive utility from receiving calls. We denote the passive 
utility of receiving a call of length q by a strictly increasing and strictly 
concave function u(q) with the same qualitative properties as u(q). 
A consumer with income y, subscribed to network i and located at x, making 
a call of length qaut to some other consumer and receiving a call of length qin 
from some consumer, enjoys a total utility of 
1 It is not necessary to take the disutility interpretation of the Hotelling transport costs 
literally, t may simply be interpreted as a parameter measuring the intensity of price 
competition. 
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where v0 is some fixed surplus from being connected, large enough to guar-
antee full participation, i.e. to prevent consumers from not subscribing in 
equilibrium. 
The timing is as follows. First, networks cooperatively choose a reciprocal 
access charge, then they (noncooperatively) set on- and off-net prices, and 
the fixed fee in case of two-part tariffs. Consumers choose a network to 
subscribe to and then they choose the length of their on- and off-net calls. 
Let 
q(p) = argmaxq{u(q) - pq} 
be the consumer's demand, writing % short for the demand for on- and 
off-net calls q(pij)- Denoting by 
v(p) = max{u(q) - pq} 
q 
net surplus, under price discrimination with given market shares a:1 and a:2 , 
network i offers its subscribers a total net surplus of2 
(2.1) 
Letting 
we may write 
(2.2) 
2.3 Existence and Stability of Equilibria 
2.3.1 Existence of Consumer Equilibria 
Imagine prices are fixed, and consumers have to decide which network to sub-
scribe to. Due to the tariff-mediated network externalities and the call exter-
nality, a consumer's utility is influenced by all other consumers' subscription 
decisions. His decision problem is therefore not a simple optimization, but a 
strategic one. For fixed prices, consumers are actually playing a multi-person 
2Throughout this work, let {i,j} = {1,2} if not indicated otherwise. 
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game. Hence their subscription decisions will depend on their expectations 
about future market shares, i.e. on the subscription decisions of all other 
consumers. In this situation, the natural solution concept is the Nash equi-
librium of the corresponding game. To distinguish between this game among 
consumers and the extended two-stage extensive-form game where networks 
decide on their prices prior to consumers' subscription decisions, we call a 
Nash equilibrium of the game among consumers a consumer equilibrium. 
Thus, a consumer equilibrium is given if the market shares are such that 
no consumer has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from his subscription 
decision and switch to the other network. 
A consumer equilibrium need not be unique. To see this, suppose the on-
net prices as well as the off-net prices are the same for both networks, but 
the on-net price is below the off-net price. Suppose also, that the degree of 
differentiation between networks is small. If all consumers expect all others 
to subscribe to network 1, then it is optimal for them also to subscribe to 
network 1. The same is true for network 2, however. In this case the game 
turns out to be a coordination game, where it is an equilibrium for consumers 
to coordinate on one of the networks. If this happens, then we say that the 
market is cornered by one network. 
If the market is cornered, i.e. if a; = 1 for some i, then even the consumer with 
the weakest preferences for network i (the consumer located at xi) chooses 
to subscribe to this network. If the difference between on-net prices and off-
net prices is not large enough to overcome the horizontal differentiation for 
this extreme consumer, the result of the subscription decisions cannot be a 
cornered market. Both networks will have a strictly positive market share in 
any consumer equilibrium then. Such an outcome is called a shared market 
equilibrium. 
If there is a shared market equilibrium with O < a; < 1, then the consumer 
located at x = a 1 is just indifferent between the networks. The market 
share a 1 = a (and a 2 = 1 - a) in a shared market equilibrium can thus be 
calculated from the indifference condition 




a= 2+a(wi-w2). (2.3) 
Here, u = 1/2t measures the degree of substitutability between the two 
networks. If t - 0, networks become perfect substitutes, whereas for t - oo 
substitutability vanishes and the networks become local monopolies. 
Note that (2.3) gives the market shares only implicitly, since these occur also 
in wi on the right-hand side. To calculate the market shares explicitly, we 
insert from (2.2), setting a= a 1 = 1 - a2. Solving for a then yields 
(2.4) 
with 
Hi = 1/2 + u(hii - hii + Fi - ~). 
Obviously, for a shared market equilibrium to exist, i.e. for a > 0, Hi and 
H2 must have the same sign: H 1H 2 > 0. 
2.3.2 Stability of Consumer Equilibria 
As already discussed above, there may be multiple consumer equilibria for 
given prices. However, some of these can usually be eliminated by pointing 
out that an economically meaningful equilibrium has to be stable with respect 
to an appropriate adjustment dynamic. 
In the case where the consumers' game is a symmetric coordination game, 
there are two cornered market equilibria. However, there is also a third 
equilibrium, where each consumer subcribes to the network he is located 
closer to. Note that in this case the networks share the market equally, and 
net surplus offered to the consumers is the same for both networks. Hence 
each consumer's decision is optimal, minimizing his transport costs. However, 
this shared market equilibrium is highly unstable. To see this, consider a 
slight deviation in consumers' expectations about the market share. This 
will lead the marginal consumers to switch to the network with the higher 
market share. As a consequence, expectations are further biased in favor of 
this network, leading even more consumers to subscribe to it. The outcome of 
this positive feedback loop between expectations and subscription decisions 
ultimately leads to all consumers subscribing to one network, resulting in 
a cornered market. This phenomenon is called market tipping in network 
economics, and is commonly observed in the presence of positive network 
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externalities. We will analyze the dynamics of market shares in more detail 
in Chapter 5. 
Since there are two pure strategies for each consumer, correpsonding to sub-
scription to one of the two networks, we obtain the general result (see also 
LRTb), that generically there are either three consumer equilibria, namely 
the two cornered market outcomes and an unstable shared market equilib-
rium, if both H1 and H2 are negative, or a unique, stable consumer equi-
librium, which is a cornered market one if H 1H2 < 0, and a shared market 
equilibrium if both H1 and H2 are positive. That the number of equilib-
ria is generically three or one is a consequence of the odd-number theorem 
for equilibria of finite games with generic payoffs. The stability of a unique 
equilibrium follows from the one-dimensionality of the state space. More on 
the properties of dynamics in such games can be found e.g. in Hofbauer and 
Sigmund (1998). 
In the following we will assume that the consumer equilibrium is unique, i.e. 
a stable shared market equilibrium exists. We will see later on, that this 
assumption is justified if the degree of substitutability between networks is 
low enough. The attractive features of such an outcome are its uniqueness 
and its stability. This guarantees, that the extension of the consumers' game 
by a pricing stage prior to the subscription decision yields an extensive-form 
game with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. 
2.3.3 Network Equilibria 
Imagine prices (including the fixed fee) are set and a corresponding stable 
consumer equilibrium has been realized. If in this situation neither network 
can gain by unilaterally changing its prices or fixed fee ( taking into account 
the dependence of consumer equilibria on these values), then these values 
constitute what we call a network equilibrium. More generally, a network 
equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game between consumers 
and both networks, where networks simultaneously set prices in the first stage 
and consumers simultaneously choose a network to subscribe to in the second 
stage, having observed the prices set by networks. Since the networks are 
assumed to be identical in their cost structure, for the remainder of this work 
we restrict ourselves to symmetric network equilibria. These are network 
equilibria where the on-net and the off-net prices as well as the fixed fee 
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of the networks are the same, and the corresponding consumer equilibrium 





In this chapter we examine the case of linear pricing, which means that 
networks do not use a fixed fee, and therefore the total payment for a call is 
a linear fuction of minutes called. So in this chapter let F1 = F2 = 0. 
3.1 First Order Conditions 
In order to analyze networks' pricing decisions, we first have to derive their 
objective function, i.e. the profit functions. For given prices and a corre-
sponding stable consumer equilibrium a, profit of network 1 is given by 
and an analogous equation holds for n2. 
If we write 
MiJ = [p;J - c(l + m)]Qij + mcqji 
for the unit profit of network i (the profit a single customer of network i gen-
erates with one active call to and one passive call from network j), denoting 
by 
m=(a-eo)/c>-1 
the (relative) markup on access, profit of network i can also be written in 
the form 
33 
Taking into account that Mii depends only on Pii, the first order conditions 
for a shared market equilibrium are given by 
oo. 28Mu oo. 
2o.-;::;--Mu + o. -!':>- + -;::;----(1- 20.)M12 = 0, upu upu upu 
oo. 8M12 oo. 
2o.-;::;--Mu + o.(1- o.)-!'l- + -;::;----(1- 20.)M12 = 0, 
UP12 UP12 UP12 
and the respective equations for network 2. 
At a symmetric shared market equilibrium, where Pu = P22, P12 = P21, and 
o. = 1 /2, the first order conditions for network i read 
Inserting from (2.4), rearranging terms, and with a little abuse of notation 
treating u( % ) as an indirect utility function u( q(Pii)) of Pii, we get 
oMii 
= 
oMii (v' - u')(Pi;) 
(3.1) 
8pij 8pii (v' + u')(Pii)' 
oMii -aMii (v' + !)(pii). (3.2) 
8pii 
What can we infer from these equations about the prices in a stable shared 
market equilibrium? First, note that Mii, the simple unit profit (Pii - c)qii, 
is positive for Pii > c, and upward sloping for Pii < pM, where pM denotes 
the monopoly price (for marginal cost c) 
pM = argm~{(p- c)q(p)}. 
We also know that v' + u' < 0 and that Hi must be positive for the shared 
market equilibrium to be stable. From (3.2) then follows that the unit profit 
Mii(Pii) has the same sign as its derivative. Hence, necessarily, c < Pii < pM. 
In this sense the equilibrium on-net price is "well-behaved". This need not be 
the case for the off-net price. As equation (3.1) suggests, the sign of 8Mi;/8p,; 
depends on the sign of v' - u', which may well be positive if marginal passive 
utility is high. 
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3.2 Constant Elasticity of Demand 
To be a bit more specific, we now invoke the explicit utility function 
ql-1/r, 
u(q) = 1- 1/r,' 




and a monopoly price of 
u(q(p)) = _!1_1P1-11, 
r,-
1 v(p) = --pl-r,, 
T/ - 1 
M TJC 
p =--1· r,-
Furthermore, for simplicity we assume that the utility from passive calls is a 
fixed fraction {J 2: 0 of the utility from active calls: 
u(q) = (3u(q). 
With these specifications, we can analyze our model in more detail. Inserting 
in (3.1) and (3.2) and rearranging terms, the first order conditions for network 
1 can be expressed by the following system of equations. 
-1 1 ( 1 2/3r, 1 - {Jr, -1) 
P12 = 1 + m pM l + {Jr, + 1 + /3l11 ' (3.3) 
(3.4) 
We have intentionally written these equations so as to describe the reciprocal 
value of the off-net price as a function of the reciprocal value of the on-net 
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price. This allows us to draw the graphs of the two functions, and find all 
symmetric candidate equilibria as points of intersection of the corresponding 
curves. 
The next proposition establishes the existence of a unique, stable, symmetric 
equilibrium for low substitutability. The proof relies on the quasi-concavity 
of the profit function in the limit as a - 0. It is similar to the proof of 
Proposition 1 in LRTb. Note, however, that the result is slightly different 
from LRTb's. Indeed, the call externality prevents the existence of equilib-
rium in the case of too high substitutability even for a = Co, which is not the 
case in LRTb's model. For example, if a = Co, i.e. m = 0, and t - 0, i.e. 
a - oo, the curve given by (3.4) admits its minimum at p11 = p12 = c. For 
any positive value of /3, however, (3.3) yields p12 > c at p11 = c, and hence 
there is no point of intersection in the relevant region for large enough values 
of a. 
Proposition 1 For given access charge a, if a is small enough, there exists 
a unique, stable, symmetric network equilibrium. Its price constellation is 
given by the intersection of {3.3) and the downward sloping part of {3.4). 
Proof: Consider the case a - 0. Then the networks are monopolies and the 
prices are at their respective monopoly levels. Graphically, (3.4) degenerates 
to a vertical line at p11 = pM, intersecting (3.3) in p12 = {1 + m)pM. This 
symmetric candidate equilibrium is thus unique and stable (since Hi = 1/2 > 
0). Moreover, the market shares become constant for a - 0. Hence, given 
the candidate equilibrium values of pz2 and pz1 , network 1 's profit is 
This function is quasi-concave in (p11 ,p12), hence (pM, (l+m)pM) is its unique 
maximum. For positive values of a the slope of (3.4) becomes finite, which 
means that the candidate equilibrium on-net price falls below the monopoly 
price. The candidate equilibrium remains unique for small values of a, and 
by continuity of Hi in a it remains stable. Also, by continuity of the market 
share in prices and in a, network l's profit function remains quasi-concave. 





Figure 3.1: Three different positions of the line given by (3.3): (i) a= Co and 
f37J > 1, (ii) a< Co and f37J > 1, (iii) a< Co and /37} < 1. 
In the following we will analyze the graphs of (3.3) and (3.4) more closely, 
allowing us to derive quickly and easily a variety of comparative statics re-
sults. 
3.3 Graphical Analysis 
Let us first have a closer look at (3.3). The right hand side of this equation 
is an affine linear function of p"1}, which depends on the parameters m, 7J, 
and /3, but not on c,. Its slope decreases with (3, falling from (1 + m)-1 for 
(3 = 0 to zero for (3 = l/7J and approaching -(1 + m)-1 for (3 -+ oo. At the 
monopoly price Pn = pM, we have 
-1 1 
P12=(l+m)pM' 
which is independent of (3. Graphically this means that by increasing the 
relative importance (3 of passive utility, the line in the Pii-p1rplane given 
by (3.3) is rotated clockwise around the point (Jii7, (l+~)pM ), see Figure 3.1. 
37 
Note that without the call externality, i.e. for 13 = 0, equation (3.3) reduces 
to 
P12 = (1 + m)pu, 
the proportionality rule from LRTb. For 13"1 = 1, the line (3.3) is horizontal 
at P12 = (1 + m)pM. 
If we increase the access charge a, and hence the markup m, holding all other 
parameters constant, the line (3.3) rotates clockwise (if its slope is positive, 
13"1 < 1) or counterclockwise (if its slope is negative, 13"1 > 1) around the 
point ( !~~~=~? , 0), where it intersects the horizontal axis. In both cases the 
equilibrium moves downwards along the curve (3.4). It cannot reach the 
horizontal axis, however, since the point of intersection of (3.3) with this 
axis is always either on the negative side or to the right of 2/c, i.e. outside 
the relevant region c < Pu < pM. Hence, their is no scope for connectivity 
breakdown, meaning p12 ---+ oo, contrary to Jeon et al.'s (2004) result for the 
nonlinear pricing case. 
Turning to (3.4), we can see that this equation does not involve a, the access 
charge. Whenever 1/("l - 1) is not an integer, the right hand side of (3.4) is 
defined only if the expression in square brackets is nonnegative. The second 
term of this expression is a negative constant, it does not depend on Pu• 
The first term is positive for Pu < pM and - viewed as a function of p1/ -
downward sloping from its vertical asymptote at Pu = pM to its minimum at 
Pu = c, see Figure 3.2. For p1/ > c-1 the function given by (3.4) is strictly 
increasing and unbounded, its slope converging to ,,,-1/(,,-l) for p1/ ---+ oo. 
Furthermore, this function is convex at least for values of Pu slightly below 
pM. The second term in square brackets shifts the curve up (for a---+ oo) or 
down (for a ---+ 0). 
Since (3.4) has a negative slope in the relevant region c < Pu < pM, there 
exists at most one point of intersection with (3.3), if the slope of this line is 
nonnegative, i.e. if f3"1 :S 1. If (3 exceeds 1/"l, the slope of (3.3) is negative, and 
there exist two points of intersection. However, the second point is outside 
the relevant region if a is small. 
As announced above, we concentrate exclusively on the case where substi-
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Figure 3.2: The curve given by (3.4). 
1 
P11 
We then ask, in which way the equilibrium depends on the parameters of the 
model. All the results are derived using the graphical analysis. 
3.4 Comparative Statics 
The next lemma shows that while the on-net price always decreases with 
the substitutability parameter a, the direction of movement of the off-net 
price depends on the strength of the call externality and on the elasticity of 
demand. On the other hand, an increase in the access charge always lowers 
the on-net price and raises the off-net price. 
Lemma 1 (i} The on-net price decreases with a and the off-net price de-
creases with a if (3ry < 1, increases with a if f3'TJ > l, and is constant at 
P12 = (1 + m)pM if (3ry = 1. 
(ii} The on-net price decreases in a, while the off-net price increases in a. 
Proof: An increase in a shifts the graph of (3.4) upwards and does not 
influence the graph of (3.3). The point of intersection thus moves to the 
right, i.e. p1/ increases. The vertical direction of movement depends on the 
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slope of (3.3). If f3TJ < l (this includes the LRTb case /3 = 0), the slope 
is positive, so also p1l increases. If f3TJ > l the slope is negative and the 
intersection point moves down, and if f3TJ = l the line is horizontal at 
Increasing a or, equivalently, m, shifts the line (3.3) downwards. Since (3.4) 
slopes downward in the relevant region, the point of intersection moves down 
and to the right. This means Pn falls and p12 rises. QED 
Part (ii) of the lemma appears to contradict a result of LRTb, since the case 
of no call externality is not excluded. On p. 48 they state that the off-net 
price may decrease in a if a is not small enough, and give a numerical example 
for this. However, the values they provide ( T/ = 2 and a = c = m = l) lead to 
the candidate equilibrium prices p11 = 1 = c and p12 = 2. A small increase in 
a then does indeed decrease the off-net price, but simultaneously the on-net 
price falls below marginal cost and in this region any candidate equilibrium is 
unstable and will therefore not be realized. In the region c < p11 < pM, where 
the consumer equilibrium is stable, (3.4) is strictly decreasing and hence the 
off-net price inevitably rises with the access charge. 
In contrast to the result in LRTb, more substitutability exerts upward pres-
sure on the off-net price, if /3 is large enough. Intuitively, if the call externality 
induced negative effect of an increasing off-net price on the rival's customers 
is large, higher substitutability creates incentives for the networks to exploit 
this effect and raise the off-net price while lowering the on-net price to com-
pensate their own customers. 
3.5 The Collusive Role of the Access Charge 
Part (ii) of Lemma 1 states that varying the access charge results in the 
equilibrium prices moving in opposite directions. We know that the equilib-
rium on-net price is always below the monopoly price. If this is also the case 
for the off-net price, the impact on profits of varying the access charge is 
ambiguous.1 If, however, the off-net price is above the monopoly price, both 
1 In a symmetric equilibrium, access charges payed and received cancel out. Thus, the 
relevant monopoly price for off-net calls is based on technical marginal costs c, not on 
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prices will move towards this monopoly price ( and hence raise profits) if and 
only if the access charge is lowered. 
Imagine now that {Jr, > l. This is not an unrealistic case, since r, > l and {J 
may well be only slightly below 1. The slope of (3.3) is then negative, and 
for a > 0 we have p12 > (1 + m)pM in equilibrium. Now let the access charge 
equal marginal termination cost, so m = 0. Then the off-net price exceeds 
the monopoly price, and we have the situation described above. In order to 
maximize equilibrium profits, both networks will negotiate an access charge 
a below Co-
If {Jr,= l, the equilibrium off-net price is (1 +m)pM, independently of a. For 
a = Co then P12 is at the monopoly level, while p11 is below pM. Starting from 
these values, a small decrease in a raises Pu towards the monopoly price and 
thereby has a positive first-order effect on profits from on-net calls, but only 
a second-order (negative) effect on profits from off-net calls. In sum, profits 
rise. By continuity this continues to hold if {Jr, is not too far below 1. This 
shows that networks may prefer an access discount even for {Jr, < l. For very 
low values of (3, of course, this need not be the case. 
Graphically, this can easily be seen if we keep in mind that since (3.4) is 
independent from the access charge, networks can only shift the line (3.3) 
up or down by varying the access charge. Thereby they can select any point 
on (3.4), subject to the restriction m > -1. Maximizing profits, they will 
choose the point where their isoprofit curve is tangent to (3.4), see Figure 
3.3. The point of tangency is unique, at least if a is not too large, since (3.4) 
is convex in the vicinity of p11 = pM and the equilibrium profit function is 
quasi-concave in equilibrium prices (the upper-contour sets of the isoprofit 
curves are convex), peaking at the monopoly point (l/pM, l/pM). It follows 
immediately that the point of tangency will lie northeast from the monopoly 
point, as illustrated in Figure 3.4. This means that with the negotiated profit-
maximizing access charge, both on- and off-net prices are smaller than the 
monopoly price. If the slope of (3.3) is negative or only slightly positive, of 
course, this implies that this line intersects {Pu = pM} above the monopoly 
point. Hence 
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Figure 3.3: The collusive choice of a, illustrated for /J'T/ > 1. 
or m < 0. This analysis proves the first part of the next proposition. 
Proposition 2 Fix a > 0 small enough. There exists O < k < l such that if 
/J'T/ > k, networks will agree on an access discount, if /J'T/ < k, networks will 
negotiate an access markup, and if /J'T/ = k, networks will agree on a= Co· 
The case /3 = 0 is the case without passive utility, and we could in principle 
just refer to Proposition 2 of LRTb for the proof. In this proposition they 
state that for small a > 0 (and for /3 = 0) the profit maximizing access charge 
exceeds Co- While this statement turns out to be true, unfortunately their 
proof is flawed. In their proof, LRTb (p. 49) argue that for small a > 0 their 
Lemma 2 shows that both on-net and off-net prices increase with the access 
charge. From this they infer that starting from a = Co, a small increase in 
the access charge raises both prices toward the monopoly level and therefore 
leads to higher profits. However, actually their Lemma 2 (correctly) states 
that for small a > 0 the on-net price decreases in a. Hence it is not obvious 
that an increase in a does indeed raise profits. 
In the following we give the correct version of the proof. 
Proof- It suffices to show that networks will negotiate a markup on access if 
/3 = 0. Given the analysis in the last paragraph, the second and third part 
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of Proposition 2 then follow immediately from continuity of the negotiated 
access charge in /3"1 and from the intermediate value theorem, respectively. 
Note, that for a= Co and /3 = 0, the line (3.3) is the diagonal {P12 = P11}-
By symmetry of the equilibrium profit function in p11 and p12, the slope of 
the isoprofit curves is equal to -1 along the diagonal. The slope of (3.4) 
at the intersection with the diagonal, on the other hand, converges to -oo 
as the point of intersection approaches the monopoly point, i.e. as a -------t 0. 
Thus, for small a the point of tangency is below the diagonal (see Figure 
3.4), where p11 < p12, and by the proportionality rule, m > 0, i.e. a markup 
on access, is a necessary condition for this. QED 
As noted, for small a the profit maximizing point of tangency lies below the 
diagonal. Since networks will choose an access charge which lets this point 
become an equilibrium, we obtain the following corollary: 
Corollary 1 If a is positive but small and networks may cooperatively de-
termine the access charge, then the resulting equilibrium prices will show a 
markup on off-net calls. 
3.6 The Socially Optimal Access Charge 
From the social viewpoint, the optimal access charge is the access charge that 
maximizes welfare, the sum of profits and consumer surplus, in equilibrium: 
To maximize welfare, the caller would have to be induced to extend the 
length of his calls up to the point where marginal total utility created equals 
marginal cost. This means 
(1 + /3)u'(Qij) = C 
and is induced by a price of Pij = (1 + {3)-1c. Of course these prices cannot 
be sustained in an equilibrium, since they are below marginal cost for /3 > 0. 
Assume a benevolent regulator can set an arbitrary access charge subject to 
the technical constraint a > -eo. By symmetry, the iso-welfare curves sur-
rounding the unconstrained optimum have a slope of -1 along the diagonal 
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Figure 3.4: The socially optimal choice of a, illustrated for /3rJ > 1. 
{Pu = p12}. Since the slope of (3.4) at the intersection with the diagonal 
is smaller than -1 for small u, we can conclude that for small u the point 
of tangency of (3.4) and the iso-welfare curves lies above the diagonal, and 
therefore also above the profit maximizing point on (3.4), as shown in Figure 
3.4. This means that the welfare maximizing access charge is below marginal 
cost and also below the profit-maximizing access charge. 
Moreover, we can show that the welfare maximizing access charge might 
actually fall below zero. It follows from the additively separable form of 
(3.5) that the iso-welfare curves have vertical tangents at p12 = c(l + (3)-1• 
Since (3.4) becomes vertical at Pu = pM for u -+ 0, the point of tangency 
approaches ( 1 / pM, ( 1 + /3) / c). Denoting the socially optimal access charge by 
aw, this implies that (1 + aw~co )pM converges to 1~ 13 , or aw -+ Co ( 1 - 2 ~!~~). 
It can be seen that the sign of aw depends on the relative size of /3 and rJ. 
Note that for rJ < 1~ 13 the expression in brackets is negative, and so is aw. 
The profit maximizing access charge a1r, on the other hand, is always positive 
for small u > 0. We summarize this as follows. 
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Figure 3.5: The four different regions in /3-rJ-space. 
Proposition 3 (i) aw < Co for small a. 
(ii) If 11 < l~/3' then aw< 0 < a1r for small a. 
(iii) If 1/ > 1~.a, then O < aw < a1r for small a. 
The more relevant of the cases (ii) and (iii) of this proposition seems to be 
(ii), especially if we assume that f3 is close to 1. The four different regions 
in /J-11-space corresponding to cases /Jr,> 1 and /Jr,< l of Proposition 2 and 
cases (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3 are shown in Figure 3.5. Note that in 
this case networks may actually agree on a bill-and-keep arrangement, setting 
a = 0. This might result from the consideration that in existing mobile phone 
networks, bill-and-keep helps to save transaction costs of interconnection, a 
point not included in our model. If transaction costs are substantial and 
were taken into account, bill-and-keep might indeed turn out to be profit 
maximizing. Note, however, that contrary to the view of Gans and King 
(2001), from Proposition 3(ii) it follows that bill-and-keep is also welfare 
improving compared with cost-based access pricing. 
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3. 7 Discussion 
In this chapter we introduced call externalities in LRTb's standard model 
of network competition with linear prices and termination-based price dis-
crimination. We showed that this has a significant effect on the strategic 
incentives of network operators. 
Corroborating the findings of Gans and King (2001), Dessein (2003), and oth-
ers, our findings emphasize the point that collusion over the access charge 
will result in access sold at a discount. Nevertheless, we seem not to en-
counter this phenomenon in existing mobile phone networks, and regulators 
are usually struggling with bringing access charges down to cost. 
The reason for this might be the nonexistence of a fixed-line network in 
our models. Indeed, if networks are not allowed to price discriminate in 
access, high access charges may well be the result of networks' incentives 
to boost profits from incoming calls originating on the fixed-line network. 
Alternatively, as Gans et al. (2005) suggest, even with price discrimination 
in access, networks may agree to keep mobile-to-mobile access charges at high 
levels in order to prevent customer arbitrage, i.e. consumers' substitution of 
mobile-to-mobile calls with fixed-to-mobile calls. A detailed study of these 
arguments is beyond the scope of this work. 
Recent market research (Horvath and Maldoom, 2002) suggests that there is 
a strong tendency of mobile telephony to substitute for fixed-line telephony, 
and some business representatives in the field even believe that voice tele-
phony over fixed-line networks will ultimately disappear completely. If this 
is true, then the policy implications which can be derived from the present 




In this chapter we study network competition and compare bill-and-keep 
with cost-based access pricing within the framework of a simple model where 
two symmetric networks compete in nonlinear and discriminatory prices in 
the presence of call externalities. In contrast to Gans and King's result, 
and corroborating the view of Cambini and Valletti, we argue in favor of 
bill-and-keep, showing that such an arrangement is indeed welfare improving 
compared to cost-based access pricing. 
Again our analysis is based on the model of LRTb, which was also utilised 
by Gans and King and Cambini and Valletti. As in Chapter 2, we neglect 
fixed costs, but extend the model to include call externalities. 
Networks now compete in two-part tariffs discriminating between on-net and 
off-net calls. A customer of network i with volumes Qii of on-net and Qij of 
off-net calls, respectively, is charged 
where Fi is a fixed fee and, as usual, Pii is the price for a call from network 
i to network j. 
4.1 Equilibrium Analysis 
Under the assumption of a balanced calling pattern, profit of network i is 
1ri = o}(p;; - c)q;i + o:;o:3[(p;3 - c)Qij + (a - eo)(q3; - Qij)] + o:;F;. (4.1) 
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Remember that the market share ai of network i is determined by the indif-
ferent consumer and given by (2.3). Inserting from (2.1), we get 
1 
ai = 2 + aai[v(pii) - v(p3i) + u(qii) - il(Qi;)] -
aa3[v(p33 ) - v(pi;) + u(q,3) - u(q,i)] + (4.2) 
+ a(F3 -F;). 
Given the choices of the other network, we can derive the first order con-
ditions in the following way: Imagine that first, for fixed market shares, a 
network maximizes profits holding its market share constant. It does this 
by choosing optimal prices Pii and Pii, while the fixed fee is used to offset 
deviations of the market share. In a second step, the network chooses its 
profit maximizing market share. If ai is held constant, differentiating (4.2) 
with respect to Pii yields 
This can be rewritten as 
8Fi [-'( ) '( ) ] -8 = ai u Qii q Pii - Qii . Pii 
(4.3) 
On the other hand, maximizing profit ( 4.1) with respect to Pii for constant 
market shares yields 
or 
8BF; = ai[(c - Pii)q'(Pii) - Qii]. Pii 
(4.4) 
Comparing (4.3) and (4.4), we derive the identity c - Pii = u'(qii), and since 




Hence the profit maximizing on-net price is always at the social optimum -
since il = (Ju, this price maximizes u(q(p)) + il(q(p)) - cq(p) - regardless of 
the market share. 
Analogously, we can differentiate with respect to Pii and compare the expres-
sions for ~. This yields 
vp,3 
(1 - ai)(c + a - eo) 
Pii = 1 - ai(l + (3) (4.6) 
for ai < 1 / ( 1 + /3). For ai -+ 1 / ( 1 + (3) from below, the optimal off-net price 
goes to +oo, i.e. for o:i 2: 1/(1 + (3), it is optimal for network i to deter any 
off-net call. 
In a symmetric shared market equilibrium we have ai = ai = 1/2 and hence 
• C 
Pii = l + /3, 
• c+a-eo 
Pii = 1- (3 (4.7) 
As usual when competing in two-part tariffs, networks set prices so as to 
maximize social welfare, and then extract consumer surplus via the fixed 
fee. For the on-net price, the call externality is internalized by the network's 
pricing decision, while this is not the case for the off-net price. If a network 
lowers its off-net price, also its rival's customers benefit through the call 
externality. In equilibrium this leads to prohibitively high off-net prices if (3 
is large. Indeed, as already noted by Jeon et al. (2004), for (3-+ 1 the off-net 
price goes to +oo, resulting in connectivity breakdown. For the rest of the 
analysis we assume that (3 < 1. 
4.2 Profit Maximizing Access Charge 
In a symmetric equilibrium, where ai = 1/2 and Pii = Pii, differentiating 
profit with respect to the fixed fee yields 
07fi oai 1 
BF; = oF; [(Pii - c)qii + Fi] + 2 . (4.8) 
From (4.2), 8a;/8P; can be replaced by 
oai a 
8F; 2a[v(p;;) - v(Pii) + il(qii) - ii(%)] - 1 ' (4.9) 
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leading to 
In a symmetric equilibrium, network profit is given by 
(4.11) 
Differentiating with respect to a and inserting the equilibrium values of p;; 
and Fi derived above, yields a profit maximizing access charge which is im-
plicitly given by 
(4.12) 
Note that since q' is negative, a" is smaller than Co· Hence networks will 
invariably negotiate an access charge below marginal cost. Inserting (4.12) 
into ( 4. 7) yields 
(4.13) 
Hence the resulting off-net price is always below the on-net price, indepen-
dently of /3. 
While the off-net price for any given access charge goes to +oo for /3 -+ 1, 
this is not the case for the off-net price resulting from the collusive choice of 
the access charge - both the nominator and the denominator go to zero at 
the same rate in the expression 
Intuitively, connectivity breakdown cannot be optimal for networks that are 
maximizing joint profits. 
4.3 Welfare Maximizing Access Charge 
The socially optimal access charge aw would be the one giving rise to equi-
librium prices 
Pii = Pii = c/(1 + /3). 
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From ( 4. 7), this is achieved by 
w 2/3c a =eo---. 
1 + .8 (4.14) 
Clearly, the socially optimal access charge is below marginal cost. On the 
other hand, comparing (4.12) and (4.14) yields 
,r w l - ,8 (( R) q(pij) R ) 0 
a - a = (1 + .8)(1 + 2,8) 1 + ,_, q'(P;;) - ,_,c < , (4.15) 
and this means that the profit maximizing access charge is even smaller than 
the socially optimal one. Summarizing, 
-Co - C1 < a" < aw < Co· 
This shows that with two-part tariffs and discriminatory prices, cost-based 
access pricing can never be optimal from the social viewpoint, if the call 
externality is taken into account. 
If we agree that 'realistic' values of .8 exceed 1/3, then from (4.14) we always 
have aw < 0. It follows that from the social viewpoint, bill-and-keep, i.e. 
a = 0, is a strict improvement over cost-based access pricing. Indeed, bill-
and-keep is exactly socially optimal if .8 happens to equal ~-
Some authors, e.g. DeGraba (2003), have suggested that the caller and the 
receiver share the value of a call, i.e . .8 ~ l. Since for .8 -t 1, both a" and aw 
decrease to -eo - c1, this implies that networks' and regulators' incentives 
are almost perfectly aligned, eliminating the need for regulatory intervention 
altogether. 
4.4 Discussion 
In this chapter we studied network competition under a caller-pays system 
with two-part tariffs and termination-based price discrimination in the pres-
ence of call externalities. As in the linear pricing case, it turned out that both 
the profit maximizing and the welfare maximizing access charges are below 
marginal cost. Moreover, we made a point for the widespread bill-and-keep 
arrangements. While we agree with Gans and King that these arrangements 
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may be a result of tacit collusion, we showed that they are welfare improving 
compared with cost-based access pricing, corroborating the positive view of 
Cambini and Valletti. Finally, we demonstrated that if the value of a call 
is approximately shared between caller and receiver, the need for regulatory 
intervention tends to vanish altogether. 
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Chapter 5 
The Dynamics of Market 
Shares 
5.1 Existence, Multiplicity, and Stability of 
Equilibria 
Economists traditionally assume that economic systems are in equilibrium. If 
a system were not, the argument goes, then some individuals do not optimize, 
or have wrong beliefs. In the long run, such a state cannot persist. Therefore, 
at least in the long run, a system must necessarily be in equilibrium. 
But given that a system might initially be out of equilibrium, how does it 
get to equilibrium? Usually economists refer to some kind of evolutionary 
pressures or learning processes which drive the system to equilibrium. How-
ever, this answer raises new questions. First of all, it is well known that some 
systems do not even have an equilibrium. As an example, recall Proposition 
1 above. It can be shown that for high substitutability, i.e. large values of 
<7, a network equilibrium (in pure strategies) does not exist. In such a case, 
economists have difficulties to say anything about the outcome of competi-
tion. 
Another problem is the possible multiplicity of equilibria. It is quite common 
that economic systems admit multiple equilibria. As an example, we have 
already discussed the potential multiplicity of consumer equilibria in Section 
2.3.1. If several equilibria exist, the question arises, which of the equilibria 
will be the long run state of the system. As we have argued previously, some 
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equilibria turn out to be dynamically unstable. Such equilibria, like the 
shared market consumer equilibrium in the three equilibria case cannot be 
long run outcomes. However, it is quite possible that there are multiple stable 
equilibria. Which equilibrium prevails in the long run is then often dependent 
on initial conditions. Under such circumstances we say the system exhibits 
path dependence. 
The situation seems most predictable if there is a unique equilibrium, as is 
the case for the network equilibrium we analyzed in the previous chapters 
under certain conditions. Nevertheless, as soon as we leave the simple case 
of a one-dimensional state space, even a unique equilibrium need not suffice 
to predict long run behavior of a system. First, a unique equilibrium might 
well be unstable. Second, even asymptotic stability does not guarantee a 
predictable long run outcome. What we need is global asymptotic stability. 
By definition, global asymptotic stability guarantees that from every initial 
condition the system converges to the equilibrium in the long run. However, 
global asymptotic stability is a rather special case if the state space is two-
or higher-dimensional. 
5.2 Out-of-Equilibrium Dynamics 
5.2.1 Dynamical Systems 
Stability is not a property that equilibria do or do not possess by themselves. 
When speaking of stability of equilibria, we must refer to some underlying 
dynamics. Which dynamics to assume is always a matter of the special 
situation we are dealing with. Dynamical systems can be set up in discrete 
or continuous time, they can be stochastic or deterministic, they may be 
autonomous (time-independent) or nonautonomous, they can admit unique 
or multiple solutions, and so on. 
In this work we consider only deterministic systems, i.e. dynamical systems 
which involve no stochastic elements. Such systems are usually easier to 
work with. If a deterministic system has unique solutions, its behavior is in 
principle completely predictable. Given any initial state, we can compute 
the state for any later point of time. However, for practical purposes this 
is often not sufficient. Such systems might well suffer from sensitivity to 
initial conditions, which means that arbitrarily close initial states diverge 
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after relatively short amounts of time. This leads to chaotic behavior, making 
these systems practically unpredictable for longer horizons. 
When dealing with dynamical systems which describe the behavior of an eco-
nomic system, we must distinguish between Nash equilibria of the economic 
system and dynamic equilibria of the dynamical system. The latter are usu-
ally called stationary points of the dynamical system, and we stick to this 
term in order to avoid confusion. 
What are the forces determining the behavior of dynamical systems? When 
these systems are set up to model the behavior of a group of economic agents, 
it is usually the strategic incentives which drive the behavior of agents, and 
therefore the dynamical system. By definition, Nash equilibria are states 
in which no agent has an incentive to deviate from his strategy. Hence 
Nash equilibria typically are stationary states of the dynamics. However, 
in a non-strict equilibrium some agents have no incentive not to deviate, 
either. So, at least if there are multiple solutions, such equilibria need not be 
stationary states. On the other hand, stationary states need not be equilibria 
for some dynamics. To see this, imagine a dynamics based only on imitation 
of successful agents. 1 If we start with a homogeneous population, i.e. with all 
agents using the same strategy, then there is nothing else to imitate, and the 
system will necessarily remain in this state, even if it is not an equilibrium. 
5.2.2 Levels of Rationality 
Dynamical systems describing the behavior of a population of agents can 
roughly be classified along a line indicating the level of rationality they as-
sume. At the zero-rationality end of this line are the pure evolutionary dy-
namics, the best-known of which is the replicator dynamics (see Maynard 
Smith, 1982). This dynamics assumes that agents are hard-wired to some 
strategy throughout their life, and that this strategy is inherited by their 
offspring. Payoffs are interpreted as biological fitness in this model. The 
more successful a strategy, i.e. the higher an individual's payoff compared to 
the average payoff in the population, the more offspring this individual has. 
Hence the frequency of relatively successful strategies increases through a 
purely evolutionary force. This dynamics stems from the biological sciences 
and its usefulness in economic contexts is at least questionable. Interestingly 
1For an overview of imitation learning see Schlag (1998). 
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however, it has been shown (Borgers and Sarin, 1997) that this dynamics 
also arises from a model of agents adapting by reinforcement learning. 
On the other end of the line there are the dynamics which assume full ratio-
nality of agents, and sometimes even more than that. For example, Matsui 
and Matsuyama's (1995) perfect foresight dynamics assumes that agents are 
'omniscient', implying that they have perfect foresight and know from the 
outset which path the dynamical system will take. Given this knowledge, 
they optimize their selection of strategies along this path, and as a result, in 
aggregate the system follows exactly the path they have foreseen. 
Between these two extremes, there is the large area of bounded rational-
ity. The dynamics in this area have in common that they assume agents 
are boundedly rational, groping for optimality under the constraints of lim-
ited computing power, limited foresight, and/or limited knowledge and in-
formation about the behavior of other agents. This area includes a lot of 
rather different models of behavior which have been developed during the 
last decades, e.g. models of reinforcement learning, imitation learning, best 
response dynamics, fictitious play, etc. Some of these dynamics have been 
designed for small groups of players, others for large interacting populations. 
Our topic of interest is the behavior of consumers and network operators in a 
telecommunications market. In order to point out the difficulties arising in a 
dynamic analysis of this market we concentrate on consumers' behavior for a 
given price structure of the networks. Hence we assume that networks' prices 
and fixed fees are constant, and consumers adapt their choice of network 
subscription to the changing market shares induced by these choices. What 
is the appropriate dynamical system to set up for such a model? To answer 
this question we make several simplifying assumptions, but try to stay close 
to what we consider consumers' real world behavior to be like. 
5.2.3 Simplifying Assumptions 
First of all, given that the number of individuals participating in mobile 
telephony is several millions even in smaller countries, we assume that we 
are dealing with an infinite population of consumers. We also assume that 
all these consumers are identical, they do not differ in their demand for phone 
calls. They also do not prefer any of the networks per se, so in contrast to 
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the previous chapters we assume here that networks are not differentiated 
from the consumers' perspective. 
We further simplify the analysis by neglecting the obstacles which consumers 
usually encounter when trying to change their network subscription. The sum 
of these obstacles, be they of monetary nature or not, expressed in monetary 
units, is called switching costs. We simply assume that there are no switching 
costs. While this assumption might be called unrealistic, it does not play 
an important role in our analysis. Moreover, with number portability (the 
possibility to keep one's phone number when changing the network) likely 
to be implemented in many mobile telecommunications markets in the near 
future, actual switching costs will be greatly diminished. 
As in the previous models, we stick to the assumptions of a covered market 
and of balanced calling patterns. As already discussed in the introduction, 
this implies that the percentage of calls a consumer makes into a certain 
network is exactly equal to the market share of this network. 
Consumers cannot switch whenever they like. This reflects the fact that 
subscription contracts, which usually include a heavily subsidized handset, 
are binding for some period of time, most commonly 12 months. This induces 
inertia in the dynamics. Not all consumers get the possibility to switch at the 
same time. Instead, every time period only a small fraction of consumers is 
allowed to switch. For our purposes the most natural time period is one day. 
Given that subscription decisions are binding for 12 months, and assuming 
that contract initial dates are uniformly distributed over the days of the 
year, each day about one in 365 consumers is allowed to switch. However, 
for convenience we assume that each day the consumers getting a switching 
possibility are randomly selected from the population. While this implies 
that the same consumer may be allowed to switch on two consecutive days, 
it makes the analysis tractable by freeing us from the need to keep track 
of the contract length of each individual in the population. Furthermore, a 
consumer's expected waiting time till the next switching possibility is still 365 
days, and we will see that this assumption does not change the direction of 
movement of the state space but only the velocity, implying that the orbits 
of the corresponding dynamical systems are the same. 
Concerning consumers' beliefs, we assume that consumers have full infor-
mation about current market shares. Thus, consumers' beliefs are correct, 
they know networks' current market shares at any point in time. This as-
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sumption is a strong one, but it may be justified by consumers' possibility 
to inform themselves about current market shares from the media, or by 
consumers' ability to estimate these market shares from the distribution of 
network choice among their calling partners. 
However, we assume that consumers are myopic, i.e. shortsighted. This 
means they act as if they believe that during the time period where their 
contract is binding the market share will not change. This assumption ap-
pears not too unrealistic, since it is often observed that consumers act short-
sightedly in their daily decisions, particularly if the stakes are not very high. 
Furthermore, we assume that consumers are rational. Given their beliefs, 
consumers optimize, i.e. they make an optimal subscription decision given 
the current market shares. 
In the absence of termination-based price discrimination market shares do not 
matter for a consumer's subscription decision. Indeed, in this case for generic 
combinations of price and fixed fee there is always a network corresponding 
to a strictly dominant strategy. For any given initial market shares, this 
dominant network's share will monotonically increase to l. 
The interesting case is the one with termination-based price discrimination. 
If on-net prices differ from off-net prices, it depends on the market shares, 
which network is currently optimal. While the state of the population moves 
to this 'corner' of the market, the optimal network may change, inducing the 
population state to change the direction of movement, and the question then 
is, what behavior this dynamical process will show in the long run. 
Note that the system as we have set it up need not admit unique paths of 
the state. If for some distribution of market shares there are several optimal 
networks, we do not prescribe a certain choice to the consumers. In such a 
case, it is possible that some fraction of switching consumers chooses one of 
the optimal networks, while the remaining fraction chooses another one of 
those. Starting from such a population state, several different future paths 
are possible. 
The system as described up to now is in discrete time. Given that the stepsize 
of the system, i.e. the distance between successive states, is rather small 
( at most 3!5 of the distance between two cornered market outcomes in the 
state space), we will approximate this discrete system by one in continuous 
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time. This facilitates the analysis and does not change the system's behavior 
qualitatively. 
5.3 Best Response Dynamics 
Let us now state the dynamic model of this chapter in a more formal way. 
There are n telecommunications networks. Each network i charges its cus-
tomers a price of Pii for a single call into network j = 1, ... , n. We denote 
by Pii network i's on-net price and by Pii for i =f j network i's off-net prices. 
There is a continuum of agents, each of whom can choose among n networks 
to subscribe to. Each agent makes telephone calls to other agents. Demand 
for calls is completely inelastic, and we assume that each agent calls a fixed 
number, normalized to 1, of randomly selected other agents during a unit 
time period. Agents' total (active and passive) utility from a call is U. 
Utility is quasilinear in money, i.e. an agent's net surplus, given market 
shares x = (xi)i=I, ... ,n with Li Xi = 1, is 
n 
vi(x) = U - :~:::>ijXj, (5.1) 
j=I 
if the agent is subscribed to network i. Here we assume that U is large 
enough to prevent net surplus from becoming negative. 
Time t ~ 0 is continuous, and in each small time interval dt, a randomly 
selected fraction 8dt of agents receives a switching opportunity. An agent 
receiving a switching opportunity chooses a myopic pure best response from 
the set BR(x(t)) of (pure or mixed) best responses to x(t), i.e. he subscribes 
to a network i maximizing his instant expected payoff v;(x(t)). 
With these assumptions agents are playing a population game. Networks 
correspond to pure strategies, and the vector x of market shares is the state 
of the population, corresponding to the population's mixed strategy. Each 
agent repeatedly plays a symmetric two-person nxn game (a matrix game) 
against his calling partners. Since the latter aie randomly drawn from the 
population, and since agents are (myopic) expected utility maximizers, we 
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can say each agent plays 'against the population'. The payoff matrix of the 
game is given by the n x n matrix 
[ 
U -. Pn · · · U -. Pin l 
A= : U-Pii : · 
U - Pnl · · · U - Pnn 
The motion of the population state x(t) E Sn is then described by the set 
of differential inclusions x(t) E o[BR(x(t)) - x(t)]. Normalizing 8 = l, we 
finally obtain 
x E BR(x)-x. (5.2) 
This dynamics is known as the best response dynamics. It was originally 
formulated by Gilboa and Matsui (1991) and Matsui {1992). Mathematically 
it is equivalent to Brown's (1951) continuous-time fictitious play process with 
identical initial moves. These dynamics has thoroughly been studied by 
Hofbauer (1995), see also Berger (2001, 2005), and we will utilize their results 
for our analysis. 
The right-hand side of (5.2) is set-valued, since best responses need not be 
unique. Therefore (5.2) is a system of differential inclusions rather than a 
system of differential equations. For details on differential inclusions see e.g. 
Aubin and Cellina (1984). The right-hand side of (5.2) is upper-semicontinu-
ous with closed and convex values, guaranteeing existence of solutions through 
any initial value. However, in general these solutions need not be unique. 
Obviously, if the pure strategy i is the unique best response to x(t), the 
best response path through x(t) is a straight line, heading for i, as long as 
this strategy remains the unique best response. The sets of states x with 
BR(x) = { i} for different pure strategies i are disjoint, open and convex 
subsets2 of Sn. If after some time the best response changes to i', then the 
path suddenly heads for strategy i'. At the turning point x the respective 
payoffs are equal: vi(x) = vi,(x). 
If there is a constant solution through some point x* E Sn, then we must 
have OE BR(x*)-x*, or x• E BR(x*), which means that x• is a (symmetric) 
Nash equilibrium of the game A. 
2Some of these sets might be empty. This is e.g. the case, if some pure strategy i is 
strictly dominated. 
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As already mentioned, revising agents choose some pure strategy which is 
a best response to the current state x(t). If there is more than one such 
pure best response, then the target of the best response path can be any 
convex combination of these pure best responses. In fact, x(t) is not uniquely 
determined for such a point in time. A consequence of this is that non-strict 
Nash equilibria need not be stable. While there is always a constant solution 
through them, there may be other solutions leaving such an equilibrium. 
5.4 Two Networks 
Let us briefly review the dynamics of market shares in the standard case of 
two competing networks. Generically there are 4 different cases: 
• Network 1 dominates network 2. 
In this case U - Pu > U - P21 and U - P12 > U - P22- Put simply, 
Pli < P2i for j = 1, 2. Then network 1 is always the unique best re-
sponse. No matter what the market shares, each consumer subscribes 
to network 1 whenever he gets a revision opportunity. The unit vector 
e1 = (1, O)t, correponding to the state where all consumers are sub-
scribed to network 1, is the unique Nash equilibrium of the respective 
matrix game and the unique globally asymptotically stable stationary 
state of (5.2). Interestingly, however, if the process starts out of equi-
librium, the equilibrium is not reached in finite time. If x(t) denotes 
the market share of network 1, then (5.2) reads x(t) = 1 - x(t), with 
solution x(t) = 1 - (1 - x(O))e-t. Thus, if x(O) < 1, x(t) < 1 for all 
t. The same is generally true whenever the best response path con-
verges to a pure Nash equilibrium. However, this is an artefact of our 
assumptions of a continuum of consumers and of revision opportunities 
arriving randomly. It is not important for our main arguments. 
• Network 2 dominates network 1. 
This is just the mirror image of the first case. x = 0 is the unique Nash 
equilibrium and is globally asymptotically stable. 
• Both networks can corner the market. 
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For this case both x = 0 and x = 1 must constitute Nash equilibria. 
This is the case if Pn < P21 and P22 < p12, i.e. each network's on-
net price is below the other network's off-net price. Note, however, 
that in this case there is always a third equilibrium O < x < 1 in 
mixed strategies, where a fraction x of the population subscribes to 
network 1 and the remaining fraction 1 - x to network 2. In this 
equilibrium, all consumers must be indifferent between the networks, 
i.e. P11i+P12{l-x) = P21fi+P22(l-x), from which network l's market 
share can be calculated as 
- P22 - P12 x=--------
Pn - P21 + P22 - P12 
{5.3) 
For market shares of network 1 below this value, network 2 is the best 
response, and if the market share of network 1 is higher than x, con-
sumers prefer network 1. As a consequence, any best response path 
starting at O :$ x{O) < x converges to O and any path starting at 
x < x(O) S 1 converges to 1. In the knife-edge case x(O) = x there 
are infinitely many solutions: A path can remain at x for an arbitrary 
amount of time and then head off to either of the two pure equilib-
ria. From this analysis, both pure equilibria are locally asymptotically 
stable, while the mixed equilibrium is unstable. 
• None of the networks can corner the market. 
In this case there are no pure equilibria, i.e. p;; > p1; for j =f i. Since 
the on-net price of a network is above the rival's off-net price, best re-
sponse paths point inwards at both boundary points x = 0 and x = 1. 
Again there exists a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies given by 
(5.3). However, this time the mixed equilibrium is globally asymptoti-
cally stable. This corresponds to the case of the stable shared market 
equilibrium we analyzed in the previous chapters. Any deviation of 
network l's market share to a value below x makes all consumers pre-
fer to subscribe to network 1. Hence x(t) rises until x(t) = x again. 
Analogously, if a deviation to a value above x occurs, x(t) falls until 
equilibrium is re-established, and then remains there. 
The four generic scenarios described above are valid not only for the best 
response dynamics, but for virtually any dynamics that respects the basic 
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assumption that the driving force is consumers' incentives. More precisely, 
any payoff monotonic dynamics, i.e. any dynamics with the property that 
x(t) > 0 if v1(x(t)) > v2(x(t)) and vice versa, shows the same qualitative 
behavior as the best response dynamics in the case of two networks. The 
reason for this is that the state space is one-dimensional, and the direction of 
movement is completely determined by the payoff differences the consumers 
face. This is no longer true if we move to higher-dimensional state spaces. 
In the next section we treat the simplest of these non-trivial cases, the case 
of three networks. 
5.5 Three Networks 
If we have three different networks in the market, i.e. n = 3, then the state 
space is the two-dimensional probability simplex S3 = {x = (x1 ,x2 ,x3 ) 1 : 
Xi 2 0, I: Xi = 1}. If a best response path x( t) changes direction, then at 
the turning point consumers must be indifferent between two of the three 
networks, and they must (weakly) prefer these two to the third one. Denote 
these two networks by i and j, and the third one by k, then the indifference 
condition is vi(x) = VJ(x) 2 vk(x), or (Ax)i = (Ax)i ~ (Ax)k- The equality 
defines an affine linear subspace in S3, which is generically a hyperplane, i.e. 
a line. The weak inequality then determines a (possibly empty) halfline in S3 
which we denote by liJ · If the three indifference halflines meet in a point x* 
in S3 , then this state is a Nash equilibrium (a completely mixed equilibrium, 
a partially mixed equilibrium, or a pure equilibrium, depending on whether 
it is in the interior of S3 , in the interior of one of the faces where Xi = 0 
for some i, or at a vertex). If the indifference lines do not intersect in the 
interior of S3 , then all Nash equilibria are on the boundary of the simplex. 
We start our analysis by picking out three classes of price structures having 
particular symmetry properties. This allows us to focus on different impor-
tant types of dynamic behavior illustrating our main points. 
5.5.1 On-net Price below Off-net Price 
Consider the class of games with the property that Pii = p and Pij = q for all 
i, j E { 1, 2, 3} and i -::/= j. This means that all three networks charge the same 
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on-net price p, and the same off-net price q for calls to either of the other two 
networks. Assume furthermore that p < q, i.e. it is cheaper to call on-net. A 
consequence of this is that each network can corner the market. To see this, 
assume network i's market share Xi is close enough to 1. Then every consumer 
prefers to subscribe to this network, since almost all his calls terminate in 
network i. The situation is qualitatively equivalent to the analogous case 
with only two networks. All three networks constitute strict Nash equilibria. 
As in the two-networks case, there is also a completely mixed equilibrium 
x, which by symmetry of the networks lies in the barycenter of the simplex, 
x = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3f In addition to this completely mixed equilibrium there 
are three partially mixed equilibria on the three boundary faces of the simplex 
where one of the Xi vanishes. These three boundary faces just correspond to 
the one-dimensional simplex serving as the state space in the two-networks 
case above. By symmetry, the three partially mixed equilibria are 
(1/2, 1/2, O)t, (1/2, 0, 1/2)\ (0, 1/2, 1/2f (5.4) 
To see that these points are indeed equilibria, consider as an example the 
state (1/2, 1/2, Of Networks 1 and 2 share the market, and all customers 
pay an average call price of P = (p + q)/2, since half of their calls are on-net 
and half of them are off-net. In this situation it does not pay for a customer 
to switch to network 3, since then all his calls would be off-net, with average 
price q > (p + q)/2 = P. Hence the state (1/2, 1/2, Of constitutes a Nash 
equilibrium. However, it turns out that all four mixed equilibria are unstable. 
The instability of a partially mixed equilibrium follows from the analysis of 
the two-networks case. By the positive tariff-mediated network externality, 
a small deviation from equilibrium creates a positive feedback loop leading 
one of the networks to cover the market. The dynamics in this case are 
illustrated in Figure 5.1. The same argument works for the completely mixed 
equilibrium, and hence we obtain the following result. 
Theorem 1 If the on-net price is below the off-net price, then in the long 
run a single network covers the market. 
5.5.2 On-net Price above Off-net Price 
Next we analyze the reverse case. Again we assume that Pii = p and PiJ = q 
for all i,j E {1,2,3} and i =/- j. This time, however, suppose p > q, i.e. it 
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Figure 5.1: With positive tariff-mediated network externalities, any network 
can corner the market. 
is cheaper to call off-net. With this price structure, it is clear that no single 
network can corner the market. If the market share of a network is close 
to one, almost all calls are on-net, and hence it pays to switch to another 
network, profiting from the low off-net price. Again we have the completely 
mixed symmetric equilibrium x in the interior of the simplex. As opposed to 
the case above, this equilibrium is now unique. To see this, consider again 
the state (1/2, 1/2, O)t, where networks 1 and 2 share the market, and all cus-
tomers pay an average call price of P = (p+q)/2. This time customers benefit 
from switching to network 3, since then all calls are off-net, with average price 
q < (p + q)/2 = P. Hence the state (1/2, 1/2, O)t is not a Na.sh equilibrium, 
and neither are the other two partially mixed symmetric states. The com-
pletely mixed equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable., see Figure 5.2. 
Analogous to the two-networks case, an on-net price above the off-net price 
creates negative tariff-mediated network externalities. The resulting negative 
feedback on market shares always makes the smallest network grow. This 
can be shown as follows. Consider any state x. A customer of network i pays 
an average price of I';= px;+q(xj +xk), with {i,j,k} = {1, 2,3}, which can 
also be written as I'; = px; + q(I - x;) = q + (p - q)x;. Since p > q, I'; is 
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Figure 5.2: With negative tariff-mediated network externalities, no network 
can corner the market. 
smallest network. With customers beginning to switch to this network, its 
market share grows until another network becomes the smallest. The process 
comes to a halt if and only if all three networks are of the same size, i.e. if 
x = x. This proves our next result. 
Theorem 2 If the on-net price is above the off-net price, then in the long 
run the three networks share the market equally. 
5.5.3 Cyclic Symmetry 
The third case we analyze here is more difficult. We keep the symmetry 
assumption, but this time we assume cyclic symmetry. Consider the following 
pricing structure: Network i charges an on-net price of p, an off-net price of 
q for calls to network i + 1 (where indices are counted modulo 3), and an 
off-net price of r for calls to network i + 2. We assume the ordering r < p < q 
of these prices. This means that for customers of network i it is cheaper to 
call on-net than to call to network i + 1, but on-net calls are more expensive 
than calls to network i - 1. 
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Figure 5.3: The vector of market shares cycles around the completely mixed 
equilibrium. 
Note that this kind of pricing leads to a cyclic best response structure. The 
resulting matrix game is a variant of what is called the Rock-Scissors-Paper 
game, since its best response structure is the same as in the well-known 
children's game where one of the three symbols is shown by two players si-
multaneously, and rock beats scissors, which beats paper, which wins against 
rock. 
It is straightforward in this case to show that the symmetric state x is the 
unique equilibrium. No single network i can cover the market, since then all 
customers would strictly prefer to switch to network i + 1. Two networks 
cannot share the market. E.g. in state (xi, x2 , O)t, customers of network 1 
face an average price between p and q, while customers of network 2 pay an 
average between r and p. Since the latter is smaller, network 1 customers 
would always prefer network 2 over network 1. Note that this need not 
mean that they switch to network 2. If x2 is small enough, customers prefer 
network 3 over both 1 and 2. The most interesting question here concerns 
the stability of the completely mixed equilibrium. As we have seen above, 
the cyclic symmetry of the call prices induces all best response paths to 
surround x, following the best response cycle 1 -+ 3 -+ 2 -+ 1, as shown in 
Figure 5.3. Since the state space is a plane, and since best response paths 
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do not intersect, a single path off the equilibrium can either spiral inwards 
or outwards, or form a closed cycle. If it forms a closed cycle, then this 
cycle consists of linear pieces, i.e. it is a polygon in the simplex, in our case 
a triangle. Such closed paths have first been found by Shapley (1964), and 
have therefore been termed Shapley polygons by Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer 
(1995). In following their analysis, we can state the next result. 
Theorem 3 With cyclically symmetric prices, networks share the market 
equally in the long run if and only if p - r ~ q - p. If this is not the case, 
the market shares converge to a unique Shapley triangle. 
Indeed, Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer show that this theorem can be extended 
to more general price structures. Suppose network i charges on-net price 
Pi and off-net prices qi to network i + 1 and ri to network i + 2, where 
ri+2 < Pi+1 < qi for all i. Then there exists a unique, completely mixed Nash 
equilibrium, and the following generalization of Theorem 3 holds. 
Theorem 4 The completely mixed Nash equilibrium is globally asymptoti-
cally stable if and only if 
In case of instability, the market shares converye to a unique Shapley triangle. 
The case of instability offers a new phenomenon, which is impossible to occur 
with only two networks. Irrespective of the initial state, in the long run the 
vector of market shares approaches a Shapley triangle in the interior of the 
state space, cycling along this triangle forever. Hence at any point in time 
all three networks are present in the market, and only their market shares 
change continually. The size of the Shapley triangle depends on the price 
differences. If p - r is only a bit lower than q - p, the Shapley triangle is 
very small, and market shares are always close to equilibrium in the long 
run. If, however, q - p is much larger than p - r, the Shapley triangle is 
close to the boundary triangle of the simplex, and each network is sometimes 
close to covering the market, before eventually the next network takes over. 
This phenomenon impressively demonstrates how careful one must be when 
interpreting equilibrium in a strategic context. In the static version of the 
game, traditional comparative static analysis would in any case treat the 
market as being in equilibrium. 
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5.5.4 The General Case 
The last sections have been devoted to very special payoff structures. With 
more general payoff structures there are many different modes of market share 
behaviors. We can ask the question under what circumstances coexistence 
of all three networks is possible in the long run. One possibility is that an 
asymptotically stable shared market equilibrium exists. As we have seen, 
however, coexisting networks need not be in equilibrium, so we must take 
into account the possibility of an asymptotically stable Shapley polygon. 
It can be shown that the existence of a Shapley polygon always implies the 
existence of a completely mixed equilibrium in the interior of the polygon. 
Indeed, let L1 be an asymptotically stable Shapley polygon in Sa and let x 
be a point in the interior of L1 • Consider the a-limit of the best response 
path x(t) through x(O) = x, i.e. the set of limit points of x(t) for t - -oo. 
This limit is well defined since the area enclosed by the Shapley polygon is 
backwards invariant. Since the backwards best response path cannot cross 
itself, it must converge to another limit cycle, i.e. a Shapley polygon L2. 
Continuing in this fashion we can construct a sequence of Shapley polygons 
L1 , L2 , La, ... , where Lk+l lies in the interior of Lk. If the sequence is infi-
nite, then it must converge to a single point, which is a completely mixed 
equilibrium. If the sequence is finite, it must end in a degenerate Shapley 
polygon with empty interior, i.e. in a point. Again this point is necessarily a 
completely mixed equilibrium. 
From the convexity of the different best response regions it follows that all 
Shapley polygons are Shapley triangles. However, actually the procedure 
suggested above always ends in the completely mixed equilibrium after one 
step, because Shapley triangles turn out to be unique here. An elegant argu-
ment from projective geometry establishes this as follows (see Gaunersdorfer 
and Hofbauer, 1995). Suppose there are two Shapley polygons. Their ver-
tices lie pairwise on the lines where (Ax)i = (Ax);, and these three lines 
intersect in the completely mixed equilibrium x. Hence the vertices of the 
triangles are perspective from x. By Desargues Theorem, the extensions of 
their edges must pairwise intersect in three collinear points. However, this 
yields a contradiction, since the intersection points are the vertices of the 
simplex Sa, which are obviously not collinear. 
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The arguments from the last two paragraphs establish that coexistence of all 
three networks is possible if and only if there exists an asymptotically sta-
ble completely mixed Nash equilibrium or an asymptotically stable Shapley 
triangle. In the latter case there exists an unstable completely mixed equi-
librium in the interior of the triangle. Hence existence of a completely mixed 
equilibrium xis a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for coexistence. In 
this equilibrium, the payoffs are the same for all three pure strategies, i.e. 
(Ax)i = (Axh = (Ax)a, and the equilibrium is determined by the intersec-
tion of the three indifference halflines li2, l23 , and l31 . The best response sets 
are convex polytopes bounded by these lines. Consider now a small deviation 
from x in the direction of network 1, i.e. e1. The new state can be written 
as a convex combination 
(5.5) 
for some small e > 0. If e1 is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. if e1 E BR(e1), 
then by convexity of the best response sets and linearity of payoffs, e1 E 
BR(x!) for all 1 2:: e 2:: 0. As a consequence, there is a best response 
path starting from x and converging to e1• In this case the completely 
mixed equilibrium is unstable and a Shapley triangle does not exist. This 
contradicts our assumption, hence we must have e1 (j. BR(e1). Then either 
e2 or e3 are best responses to e1. 
Next consider a small deviation from x in the direction of e2 . As before, 
the new state can be written as a convex combination x~ = ee2 + (1 - e)x 
for some small e > 0. Again we conclude that e2 (j. BR(e2), implying that 
either e1 or e3 are best responses to e2. A completely analogous argument 
establishes that either e 1 or e2 are best responses to e3 . 
Assume x(s) for s E [0, 1) is a path (not a best response path) on the bound-
ary of 83, starting at e1 and moving clockwise to e2, to e3, and back to e1. 
Let b = (i,j, k) denote the sequence of networks which are best responses 
to x( s) along this path. Since all three networks must be present in the se-
quence (otherwise there would not be a completely mixed equilibrium), and 
since e1 cannot be a best response to x(O) = e1, we have the following four 
possible configurations: 
bE {(2,1,3), (2,3,1), (3,1,2), (3,2,1)} (5.6) 
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We can w.l.o.g. renumber the networks in such a way that e2 E BR(e1 ). This 
leaves us with the two possibilities 
b = (2, l, 3) or b = (2, 3, 1) (5.7) 
Consider the first case, b = (2, 1, 3). Here the first switch of the best response 
to x( s) is from e2 to e1, and it occurs at the intersection of the boundary 
of the simplex with the indifference halfline l12• Since e2 is not a Nash 
equilibrium, the indifference halfline l12 must intersect the edge connecting 
e 1 and e2. Call the intersection point x 12 . In state x 12 agents are subscribed 
only to networks 1 and 2, they are indifferent between these two networks and 
strictly prefer them to network 3. Hence x 12 is a Nash equilibrium. Again 
it follows that there is a best response path leaving x and converging to x 12 , 
rendering x unstable and implying the nonexistence of a Shapley triangle. 
This is a contradicition, sob# (2, 1, 3). It follows that b = (2, 3, 1). 
The last paragraph proved that b = (2, 3, 1) is a necessary condition for coex-
istence. We show now that together with the nonexistence of pure strategy 
equilibria it is also sufficient. 
Note that b = (2, 3, 1) together with the nonexistence of a pure strategy equi-
librium effectively means that for any two networks i and j, the indifference 
halfline l;j does not intersect the edge connecting e; and ej. This is equiva-
lent to saying that there are no Nash equilibria on the edges of the simplex. 
In this case the boundary of the simplex is repelling for best response path, 
and every such path eventually stays in the interior of the simplex. Hence, 
nonexistence of a boundary Nash equilibrium is a sufficient condition for co-
existence. The same is of course true in the two networks case. We subsume 
this analysis in the following theorem. 
Theorem 5 In the case of at most three networks there is coexistence in 
the long run if and only if there are no Nash equilibria involving an unused 
network. 
Note that the analysis relies on special geometric properties of the plane 
which do not extend to higher dimensions. For this reason we cannot derive 
the same result for the case of four or more networks. 
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5.6 Discussion 
The emphasis in this chapter lies on the point that the usual static interpre-
tation of consumer equilibrium has a serious weakness in models of network 
competition. We have seen that as soon as three or more networks are 
present, existence of a stable consumer equilibrium is no longer guaranteed. 
Moreover, if such an equilibrium happens to exist, then there are typically 
multiple ones. An exception is the case we called on-net prices above off-
net prices, where a unique and globally asymptotically stable shared market 
equilibrium exists. Unfortunately the pricing patterns observed in real-world 
telecommunications networks are just the opposite of this case. This leads 
to an interesting puzzle, to which the next chapter is devoted. 
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Chapter 6 
The Coexistence Puzzle 
6.1 Introduction 
In existing mobile telecommunications markets throughout Europe an ob-
servable common phenomenon is that on-net prices are considerably below 
off-net prices. This is due to access charges above marginal cost, the reason 
for which has been discussed at the end of Chapter 4. At the same time, 
telecommunications services appear to be very close substitutes. Indeed, 
voice telephony services offered by different network operators can hardly be 
argued to show any significant characteristics of horizontal product differenti-
ation. It seems reasonable, therefore, to treat these services as homogeneous. 
A consequence of this is that the results of the standard models, including 
their extensions such as in Chapters 3 and 4, are no longer applicable, since 
a common feature of these models is the nonexistence of equilibrium under 
close substitutability. 
A study of market share dynamics for fixed pricing structures in the absence 
of product differentiation has been provided in the last chapter. Recall The-
orem 1 for the three-networks case, and the analogous analysis for the case of 
two networks. It is easy to generalize this theorem for an arbitrary number 
of networks and asymmetric prices (but keeping each network's on-net price 
below its off-net price). 
Theorem 6 Assume n 2: 2 symmetric networks compete in the market, be-
havior of market shares is given by the best response dynamics, and each 
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network i offers on-net price p, and off-net price q; with p; < q;. Then in the 
long run a single network covers the market. 
Proof: Assume the initial state is x E Sn. The average price ~(x) paid by 
network i's customers is ~(x) = p;x; + q;(l - x,) = q, - (q; - p;)x;, which is 
decreasing in x •. The network currently offering the lowest average price will 
grow, and this lowers its average price even further. All other networks lose 
market share and thereby their average price rises. In the long run then, a 
single network covers the market. QED 
As we have argued previously, it is a straightforward consequence of on-net 
prices below off-net prices, that positive tariff-mediated network externalities 
drive the initially largest network to eventually corner the market. Given that 
network services are homogeneous, we should expect to see the respective 
markets to be dominated by a single network. Nevertheless, several networks 
seem to coexist in these markets for years. 
One obvious objection to this "coexistence puzzle" is that real-world markets 
are not yet in equilibrium. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that not 
even the movement of market shares is in line with our predictions. In many 
national markets, large established networks loose market share to newcomers 
or younger and smaller competing networks. How can this happen? In this 
chapter we suggest a solution to the coexistence puzzle which relies on the 
rejection of the balanced calling patterns assumption. 
6.2 Local Interaction Models 
All the models we studied up to now were based on the assumption of bal-
anced calling patterns. Recall that this assumption means that each cus-
tomer in the market calls each other customer, or at least that he has the 
same probability of calling each other consumer. This assumption was nec-
essary to allow us to treat the interaction as a population game. For each 
customer the mixed strategy to best respond to is the average strategy in the 
population, i.e. the population state. As a consequence, if it is optimal for 
a customer to choose network i, then this is optimal for all customers, since 
all are playing the same game. Consider an extreme opposite case, where 
the whole population is split up into pairs of consumers and each consumer 
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exclusively calls his partner. It is clear that with this kind of calling patterns, 
under the assumptions of Theorem 6, each pair of consumers will coordinate 
on one of the networks after at least one consumer in each pair has received 
a switching opportunity. The long run market share of a network depends 
on the initial state, but can be any fraction in (0, 1]. 
In real populations, the interaction structure is somewhere between these 
two extreme cases. While calling patterns will definitely not be balanced in 
the strict sense, most people typically make phone calls to more than one 
partner. A quick and non-representative survey among the author's acquain-
tances suggests that people usually direct a large majority of their private 
monthly phone call minutes to only a handful of close friends or relatives, 
while a rather small minority of call minutes terminates in the rest of the pop-
ulation. Such a pattern of interaction is called local, as opposed to the global 
interaction structure leading to balanced calling patterns. Consequently, evo-
lutionary or social learning models assuming that each agent interacts only 
with a finite set of other agents are called local interaction models. The game 
theoretic literature on local interaction models started with Ellisons's (1993) 
extension of the basic stochastic evolution models of Kandori et al. (1993) 
and Young (1993). Important results are due to Blume (1993, 1995), Goyal 
(1996), Berninghaus and Schwalbe (1996), Young (1998), and Ellison (2000). 
Closely related are recent studies of the contagion effect, see Morris (2000) 
or Lee and Valentinyi (2000). The economics literature on local interaction 
is surveyed by Brock and Durlauf (2001). In the following we give a general 
definition of a local interaction game in the context of telecommunications. 
Let X be a countable population of agents, where each agent x represents 
a consumer in a telecommunications market. Let ~ be a binary relation on 
X. This relation is meant to describe who makes phone calls to whom. We 
assume that each agent only calls his "friends" , where x' is a friend of x if 
x ~ x'. We assume that friendship is irreflexive, x ,,,., x, and symmetric, 
x ~ x' => x' ~ x. Thus no agent calls himself, and each agent is the friend 
of each of his friends. Let F(x) be the set of x's friends. We assume that each 
agent has at least 1 and at most m friends, 1 ::; IF(x)I ::; m. Each agent can 
choose between n networks in N = { 1, ... , n}, where network i offers prices 
Pii for calls to networks j E N. Time proceeds in discrete steps t = 0, 1, 2, ... , 
and for simplicity we assume that each agent receives a switching opportunity 
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at every time step. The state S of the population is here not the vector of 
market shares but the exact distribution of networks on the population of 
agents, i.e. a function S : X -+ N, where N = {1, ... , n}, giving for each 
agent x his network choice S(x). The system starts with an arbitrary initial 
state S0 • At each time t + 1 each agent x EX chooses a best response to St, 
i.e. a network i minimizing his total payment ~(x, St): 
where 
~(x, St) = L Pi,St(x')· 
x'EF(x) 
A state S is a Nash equilibrium if no agent has an incentive to deviate from 
his choice. Clearly, Sis a Nash equilibrium if and only if SE BR(., S). 
The setting is very general up to now. However, we concentrate on a partic-
ularly simple model in order to isolate the differences in long run behavior 
as compared to the last chapter. Thus we consider only the two-networks 
case n = 2. Moreover, we assume again a symmetric pricing structure 
P11 = P22 = p and P12 = P21 = q with on-net price below off-net price, 
p < q, as in Theorem 6. Finally, we assume that each agent has exactly 
three friends1, i.e. IF(x)I = 3 for all x EX. With these specifications, the 
long run behavior of the population state depends - apart from the ini-
tial state - only on the exact graph of the friendship relation on X. One 
particular such graph is exemplified in the next section. 
6.3 A Simple Hexagonal Graph Structure 
Let X = Z2 and define the following binary relation on X: 
(6.1) 
V [x1 +x2 is even/\ (x~,x;) = (x1,X2 + 1)] 
V (x1 + X2 is odd/\ (x~, x;) = (x1,X2 - 1)] 
1 An odd number of friends helps to avoid the knife-edge case of indifference between 
the networks. 
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(0,1) (1,1)~  /2,; 
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(0,0) (1,0) 
Figure 6.1: The graph of the friendship relation given in (6.1) 
With these specifications each point in the plane with integer coordinates 
corresponds to an agent, and each agent has three friends: His immediate 
left neighbor, his immediate right neighbor, and alternatingly his immediate 
upper or lower neighbor, respectively. The corresponding graph is illustrated 
in Figure 6.1. Of course this graph is just one particular example. Indeed, 
even if X is taken to be finite, the size of the set of all graphs meeting 
the assumptions of the last paragraph grows exponentially in the number of 
elements of X. The graph we study here is particularly simple because of its 
obvious translation invariance. For each agent (x1, x2) with even sum x1 + x2 
we call the set of the six agents 
a hexagon. A hexagon thus consists of the six agents on the boundary of one 
of the rectangles visible in Figure 6.1. 
It is now easy to see the following: 
Lemma 2 Let H be a hexagon and assume ST(x) = i for all x EH. Then 
Si(x) = i for all x EH and all t ~ T. 
In other words, if all agents in a hexagon use the same network i at time 
t = T, then they will use the same network i at any time t ~ T. The reason 
for this is that each agent x in a hexagon has exactly two friends in the same 
hexagon. So if all agents in a hexagon use network i, then at least 2/3 of the 
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friends of x use network i. Therefore x's total payment when subscribing to 
network i is strictly smaller than when subscribing to network j, as2 
.P;(x, St) = 2p + Pik S 2p + q < 2q + p S 2q + P;k = P;(x, St), 
where k is the network used by the third friend of x. 
This simple result has a deep impact on the nature of Nash equilibria of 
our local interaction game. The next theorem follows immediately from 
this lemma and the observation that the complement in X of the union of 
hexagons is again a union of hexagons. 
Theorem 7 Let M be the union of arbitrary many hexagons in X. Define 
the state S* by S*(x) = i for all x E M and S*(x) = j for all x EX - M. 
Then S* is a Nash equilibrium. 
This result says that virtually any distribution of market shares on the two 
networks can be generated in equilibrium. Of course this plethora of equi-
libria is devastating for the predictability of market shares, even for given 
prices. 
6.4 Discussion 
As mentioned before, the graph we studied in this chapter is just one particu-
larly simple example. As such, it does not show some of the characteristics of 
calling patterns found in real societies, e.g. the "small world" phenomenon 
(see Watts, 2000). Nevertheless, in its basic structure it comes close to 
what might be considered the important such characteristics. The decisive 
assumption here is that a person typically has only a handful of frequent call-
ing partners, whereas only a minority of its call minutes are distributed more 
or less randomly over the rest of the population. If this person's friends hap-
pen to coordinate on a single network, then the incentive for it to subscribe 
to the same network is overwhelming, if only on-net prices are significantly 
below off-net prices. Since it is not unrealistic (albeit ruled out in our model) 
to assume that small groups of friends will tend to deliberately coordinate 
2It is straightforward to extend this argument to an arbitrary (but odd) number of 
friends under the symmetry assumptions made: Each agent will join the network the 
majority of his friends has joined. 
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in this way, there is considerable room for smaller networks to gain market 
share, despite the positive feedback loop which would inevitably favor large 
networks under balanced calling patterns. 
The analysis of networks' strategic price setting behavior under a local in-
teraction structure, however, is made extremely difficult by the multitude 
of existing consumer equilibria. While we have tried to answer some of the 
questions arising in the study of the economics of two-way interconnection, 
many more such questions became apparent. This research issue, therefore, 
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